A framework for privacy-preserving, distributed machine learning using gradient obfuscation by Phadke, Nishad Ashok
c© 2017 Nishad Phadke
A FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY-PRESERVING, DISTRIBUTED




Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science in Computer Science
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2017
Urbana, Illinois
Adviser:
Professor Nitin H. Vaidya
Abstract
Large-scale machine learning has recently risen to prominence in
settings of both industry and academia, driven by today’s newfound
accessibility to data-collecting sensors and high-volume data storage
devices. The advent of these capabilities in industry, however, has
raised questions about the privacy implications of new massively
data-driven, subscribable services offered by corporations to individ-
uals. Recent lines of research have developed algorithms designed
to scale in distributed machine learning environments that make
certain privacy guarantees to subscribers without hindering the
quality of service the corporations are able to provide. In this work,
we fully implement one such distributed optimization framework
and rigorously test its parameterized convergence properties. We
also develop a system of both disruptive and nondisruptive attacks
designed to aggressively intrude upon subscribers’ privacy and to
glean subscribers’ private data from information readily available
within the framework’s network. These attack techniques can be
seamlessly integrated into the aforementioned distributed optimiza-
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1 Introduction
Large-scale learning is a subfield in machine learning that has emerged only
relatively recently, enabled by the accessibility of incredible amounts of data [35]
and the ability to store it cheaply. Companies like Apple, Facebook, and Google
especially have access to the data of their massive userbases and can leverage
knowledge gleaned from their data pools to launch new services with the help
of in-house deep learning systems to gain insights into their users’ needs.
Google, for example, has used DistBelief [11] for speech recognition [20],
image classification [40], and more and has packaged it into publicly-available
tools like Google Street View [18]. Yahoo, Baidu, and Microsoft have all de-
signed related systems [3, 19, 29], but even more fascinating is the widespread
accessibility of equally powerful frameworks designed to solve arbitrary, computa-
tionally taxing problems. A good example is Apache Spark [44], an open-source
framework [13] that has risen to prominence in recent years and has spawned
multiple offshoots [43]. Freely available code like Mozilla’s implementation [32]
of Baidu’s DeepSpeech [19] and freely available machine learning frameworks
like Torch [10, 42] and TensorFlow [1, 41] have all made gaining insight into
large quantities easier than ever.
The ability to access such frameworks with ease, coupled with deep learning
techniques’ exceptional accuracy, has invited the creation of powerful (often
commercial) machine learning-based services that are only as useful as the
amount of data the services’ creators are privy to, whether that data is obtained
automatically as a byproduct of subscribing to a particular service or if users
must voluntarily submit and/or surrender their data. Naturally, in order to
offer better services, service providers must collect massive amounts of data,
but performing massive data collections creates serious privacy challenges.
Not only does the collection, itself, of data pose obvious problems for privacy
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goals but so do certain methods of storing that data. Centralized storage
schemes, for example, are prime examples of data storage methods that subvert
privacy. First and foremost is that users’ personally identifying information (list
of affiliates, physical location, etc.) and/or users’ sensitive data (service usage
patterns, photographs, voice recordings, chat logs, etc.) are being centrally held
by companies for as long as the companies desire. In some cases, the service
providers may even assume ownership of any uploaded data. Even if a company’s
privacy policy prohibits it from doing so, users must rely on trust to assure
them that the companies that have access to their data are handling their data
responsibly. Trust notwithstanding, as long as the company is able to read users’
data, users’ privacy ought to be considered compromised, as users inherently
lose all control of when access to the data can be issued or revoked and for what
purposes the data can be used.
Such data access management expectations are not unreasonable, either.
Privacy-aware individuals may desire some of these guarantees so they can
decide when data can be accessed by whom as a means of controlling how their
data is being used. A user may, for example, want to hide data that could reveal
his/her political affiliation or income bracket. This desire is not limited just to
individuals. Larger entities may also want more refined control over how their
data is being accessed and used.
Centralized storage schemes are also more susceptible to “surprise” data
accesses. Law enforcement can subpoena data from companies’ data banks
and could potentially impose surveillance requirements that would require
companies to report on specific data. Just as legal entities can access data in one
fell swoop, though, so can adversaries (“hackers”) who gain unauthorized access
to companies’ data stores. Keeping data together—whether geographically,
logically, or otherwise—makes it easier to steal it all at once. Keeping data
isolated across national borders, across data centers, and even across devices of
different types helps protect the integrity of the data; it takes more resources to
compromise multiple devices, especially if the devices are not identical to each
other (e.g., different software protections, different hardware, different operating
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systems) [21].
The push to decentralized storage schemes is clear [7, 22] and is accompanied
by new advances in distributed learning algorithms. These algorithms are not
only inherently robust and scalable [27] but also resource efficient as they
often avoid expensively sharing entire blocks of data by choosing instead to
share only incremental updates that cumulatively encode the same amount of
information but with significantly less bandwidth, a much needed benefit in
today’s computing space [4, page 117].
Decentralizing data, alone, will not be enough to bring privacy guarantees to
data owners—even if the data never leaves the hands of its owners—when users
secondarily are interested in bringing their data together to learning something
meaningful from the contained information. For example, owners of medical data
(e.g., hospital records administrators, biomedical researchers) may want to learn
deep characteristics from the data they possess—and perhaps even from medical
data that other medical data owners possess—without being forced to surrender
patient data, which would violate ethical and legal confidentiality clauses. If data
owners are to collaboratively learn a model, information must necessarily be
shared between learning participants, but decentralizing data and then sharing
raw values during the learning process is equivalent to pooling data into a
central server, which brings no improvements to privacy. Several alternative
distributed optimization techniques have been proposed recently [34, 2, 8], but
we examine a particular, novel gradient descent algorithms [14] rigorously proven
to correctly find function optima in distributed settings with multiple parameter
servers, as well as those algorithms’ peer-to-peer variants [15, 16]
In this work, we build a Python framework for this set of distributed gradient
descent algorithms that consist of two primary components, parameter servers
and workers, that cooperate to jointly find the minimum of a shared cost
function. Parameter servers, data-less entities responsible for making available
their individual and up-to-date estimates of the optimum, stay in step with each
other and enable inbound requests so workers, data-rich entities responsible for
providing computation power independently of any other worker, can request
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current parameter estimates and can send back to the parameter servers gradients
of the shared cost function computed over the worker’s own private dataset. In
this way, multiple workers can work side-by-side to minimize a cost function
over the union of their own private datasets. By means of simply sharing
mutual parameter server(s), workers can cooperate with each other without
ever communicating directly with one another, without needing to know of any
other worker’s existence, and most importantly without ever needing to share
their private datasets with any other entity in the system: neither parameter
servers nor other workers. We then develop and evaluate a set of strategies that
a parameter server can leverage to attempt to break the privacy guarantees of
the system.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce
work by other authors in related lines of research as well as foundational
information needed as background for the results presented in this work. In
Chapter 3, we introduce the datasets that we use as benchmarks to evaluate
the performance of our system and of our attacks. In Chapter 4, we detail the
design considerations and theoretical specifications surrounding our distributed
optimization framework, and we analyze our framework’s convergence properties.
In Chapter 5, we propose and test multiple attack vectors that agents in a
system could use to intrude upon the privacy of other participants. Finally, we
conclude our work in Chapter 6.
4
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Gradient Descent
Gradient descent is an algorithm used to numerically locate the minimum of a
function. Formally, given a convex function f(x) : Rn → R, gradient descent
can compute
x∗ = arg min
x∈Rn
f(x) (2.1)
Gradient descent requires an initial guess s0 after which successive steps are
make toward the optimal s∗ by considering the sequence s0, s1, s2, . . . where
each sk+1 is computed from sk in the following manner:
sk+1 ← sk − αk∇f(sk) (2.2)






,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} (2.3)
where ski denotes the i-th element of the k-th step from the vector s0.
If the step size is too large, the sequence {sk} may never converge, but with
a correctly chosen parameter αk (not necessarily constant), we have
f(s0) ≥ f(s1) ≥ f(s2) ≥ · · · (2.4)
and that the sequence 〈sk〉 approaches s∗.
When f(·) is convex, under certain conditions of αk, {sk} will always converge
to s∗ since all local minima are global minima, but when f(·) is nonconvex, {sk}
may only converge to a local optima of f(·), under the same conditions of αk.
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In the context of machine learning, the loss function that is to be minimized
must take into account the dataset on which the parameters are being optimized.
These loss functions are often nonconvex, but we are often content with settling
on a local minimum in place of the global minimum [9]. If we have a labeled
dataset with n observations, each with m features and ` labels, then we can
represent our labeled dataset as a sequence of pairs,
D = 〈(xi,yi) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}〉 (2.5)
where xi ∈ rm and yi ∈ r`. We can write our loss function as
fD(θ) (2.6)
where θ is a vector of parameters that we are trying to fit to the dataset D. Our
initial guess for parameter vectors is θ0 but our gradient descent step is now
θk+1 = θk − αk∇fD(θk) (2.7)
Often times, however, datasets used in machine learning optimization prob-
lems can be quite large, so computing fD(θk) can be quite expensive. It may
take too much time, or it may be impossible for one machine to load the entire
dataset D into memory at once. An alternative to gradient descent, known as
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is often used in its place.
Traditional SGD is like gradient descent except that it evaluates its loss
function operating on one data point at a time. If we define Di = 〈(xi,yi)〉
(i.e., Di is a restricted dataset consisting only of the i-th sample from the larger
dataset D), then our gradient update step becomes
θk+1 = θk − αk∇fDi(θk) (2.8)
where i takes on a new value in the set {1, 2, . . . , n} in no particular order at
each step k, taking on the same values more than once if there are enough steps
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to afford it.
Each gradient computation will be computed for a different loss function,
though, since each fDi(·) will be a different function altogether. Thus in reality,





Each ∇fDi(θk) is—in total, across all i—representative of ∇fD(θk), so the





when in truth it is approximating
arg min
θ





In practice, however, rather than using a single sample at each iterated
update, it is common practice to use minibatching instead, where 32, 64, or
even 128 samples are used instead of one. The size of the minibatch ought to be
chosen based on the dataset and the hardware capability the learning is being
performed on.
2.2 Parameter Server Architecture
Traditional, centralized machine learning algorithms work by housing large
datasets on one machine and executing machine algorithms locally, sampling
their training data and optimizing their model parameters through iterations.
Since some training datasets can be as large as dozens of terabytes in size [6],
however, it is often unreasonable to expect a single machine to be able to manage
such large quantities of raw data while simultaneously solving machine learning
problems at a sufficiently rapid pace.
This led to the rise of the parameter server framework [26, 38], which allows
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not only data but also computational capability to be distributed (perhaps
unevenly) among worker nodes. Parameter servers hold the details of the model
(i.e., the parameters), in either dense or sparse vector format, and it is the
workers’ responsibility to request parameters from the parameter server, compute
gradients of the loss function over each worker’s own dataset, and send gradients
back to the parameter server. The parameter server incorporates the gradients
computed by each of its workers (by means of a simple vector subtraction) and
then stands ready for the same workers to re-request the new parameters.
The benefit of such a strategy to the system, itself, is that there is no longer
a requirement to have a dataset in a central location. The benefit to workers
from subscribing to such an architecture is that workers can incorporate other
workers’ data into their learning process. With a larger dataset observable during
training, each worker’s model will be more precise and more useful than any
model that a single worker could have trained alone, all without the extremely
large overhead of transferring raw data between all learning participants and
subsequently running a purely local training algorithm.
Consider a system with one parameter server and C workers, numbered from
i = 1, 2, . . . , C. Let each worker i possess dataset Di and be able to compute
∇fDi(θ), the gradient of the loss function at different parameter values θ over
dataset Di. Note that this Di differs from the notation introduced in §2.1.
Henceforth, we discard the definition from §2.1 and use only the definition of
Di presented here. The system will undergo multiple iterations until either
convergence or a predetermined number of iterations are reached, orchestrated by
the parameter server, where one iteration is defined by one round of parameter-
gradient exchanges between the parameter server and all workers. The parameter
server will follow Algorithm 1 and the workers Algorithm 2.
As discussed in §2.1, workers can opt to use SGD in place of in Line 4 of
Algorithm 2 on the next page.
This straightforward abstraction of parameter management away from work-
ers is ripe for improvement, though, as the scheme highlighted in this section
only provides privacy in the sense that workers no longer have to share their
8
Algorithm 1 Simple parameter server
1: Initialize θ0
2: Initialize k ← 0
3: repeat
4: Upload θk to all C workers
5: Download ∇fDi(θk) from each of the C workers




7: k ← k + 1
8: until convergence
9: return optimized parameter vector θk to all workers
Algorithm 2 Simple worker node
Require: the local dataset Di
1: Initialize k ← 0
2: repeat
3: Download θk from parameter server
4: Compute ∇fDi(θk) . gradient over local dataset
5: Upload ∇fDi(θk)
6: k ← k + 1
7: until convergence
8: Download final value θk from parameter server
raw datasets in order to collectively reach the optimum. The parameter server
architecture does not, however, provide the workers with any privacy from the
parameter server, itself (see Chapter 5), but it is still a basic building block of
the framework [14] we implement in §4.2.
2.3 Regression and Classification
The parameter server architecture outlined in §2.2 is capable of handling any
problem that can be reformulated or approximated as finding the minimum of
a function f : Rn → R. In this work, we examine a subset of machine learning
problems called classification problems that can be solved using gradient. In
such problems, each sample has one or more features that are used to predict
which class said sample falls into, where each sample falls into one or more




Binary classification In binary classification problems, each sample in
the dataset can only fall into one of two classes. That is, in a dataset
D = 〈(xi, yi)〉, we know xi ∈ Rn and yi ∈ {0, 1}, where n represents
the number of features each sample contains. For example, given
several characteristics of an American adult (e.g., age, race, region
of residence) predict whether or not said adult’s annual salary is
at least $50,000 [28, “Adult Data Set”]. One machine learning tool
to perform binary classification is the support vector machine. A
common statistical approach to finding the parameters θ∗ ∈ Rn that
best classify the xi samples into their respective yi classes is logistic
regression. It is well-known [33] that logistic regression problems can











+ (1− yi) log
(
1− 11 + e−θ·xi
)]
(2.12)
where a · b denotes the dot product of vectors a and b.
Solving the logistic regression problem is then reduced to finding
θ∗ = arg min
θ
fD(θ) (2.13)
In fact, this particular loss function can be minimized analytically,
but we can also perform gradient descent to find the global minimum,
since the loss function is convex. Once the optimal parameters θ are
computed, we can use the hypothesis functions [33]
Pr[yi = 0] =
e−θ·xi
1 + e−θ·xi (2.14)
Pr[yi = 1] = 1− Pr[yi = 0] (2.15)
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to compute the probability that x belongs to one class over the other.
We can take the higher probability (since the two probabilities must
sum to unity) and ultimately choose that as the final prediction.
Multiclass classification In multiclass classification, also known as
multinomial classification, each sample in the dataset can still only
fall into exactly one class, but the number of possibilities is greater
than two (and finite). That is, yi ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,Γ}. For example, given
a 32× 32 pixel image, determine whether the image is an airplane,
automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, or truck [23], but
it is known that no image can ever fall into two or three categories.
Multiclass classification can be implemented using a variety of tech-
niques, like k-nearest neighbors, näıve Bayes, and neural networks.
Multinomial logistic regression, also known as softmax regression, is
a statistical technique used to perform multiclass classification.
Since each sample can fall into exactly one of Γ + 1 classes, multi-
nomial logistic classification can be performed by fitting Γ + 1 in-
dependent binary logistic regression and obtaining Γ + 1 different
parameter vectors (i.e., θ0,θ1, . . . ,θΓ), one for each independent re-
gression. The softmax function is then applied to obtain a probability
distribution over the Γ + 1 classes, which also provides the differen-














where θ is the union of each individual regression parameter vector
θk and
χ(a, b) =
1, if a = b0, else (2.17)
The creation of this loss function paves the way for use of gradient
descent to find the optimal aggregate parameter vector θ.
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The output of the softmax function is a vector p̂i of length Γ + 1,
where each p̂γ represents the probability that the input sample falls
into class γ. In fact, the softmax function is applied even when using
neutral networks instead of logistic regressions because it provides
exactly this property. Naturally, this implies that the elements of p̂i
sum to unity. Note that Equation 2.16 on the preceding page is, in
fact, a multiclass generalization of Equation 2.12 on page 10.
In all types of single-label classification describe above, accuracy is always
computed as
number of correctly classified test samples
total number of test samples (2.18)
Multi-label classification In multi-label classification, each sample in the
dataset must fall in at least one class and can fall into at most all Γ + 1
classes, where the total number of classes is at least 2 and finite. That
is, Γ + 1 ≥ 2, and in a dataset D = 〈(xi,yi)〉, we know xi ∈ Rn and
yi ∈ P ({0, 1, . . . ,Γ})\{∅}, where n represents the number of features each
sample contains and P(S) is the powerset of set S. A common method to
tackle multi-label classification transforming the multi-label classification
problem into a series of Γ + 1 binary classification problems, representing
whether the sample either falls into or falls out each of the Γ + 1 categories.
This time however, instead of applying a softmax regression, we can use
the binary logistic function (Equation 2.14) to compute the probability of
whether or not the i-th sample falls into the γ-th class. That is, we again
output a vector p̂i of length Γ + 1 where
(p̂i)γ =
1
1 + e−θ·xi (2.19)
and use a hard threshold of p̄ ∈ [0, 1] to declare our prediction that
12
sample i falls into class γ if and only if
(p̂i)γ ≥ p̄ (2.20)
Note that this time, the elements of p̂i do not sum to unity. Common
values for the threshold p̂ are values between 0.5 and 0.8.
We define q̂i ∈ P ({0, 1, . . . ,Γ}) as the set of classes that sample i is




∣∣∣ (p̂i)γ ≥ p̄} (2.21)
Note that although it is required that |yi| ≥ 1, it is possible to predict that
sample i does not fall into any class. That is, it is possible that |q̂i| = 0.
We can compute the accuracy of a sequence of predictions, 〈q̂i | ∀i〉, against










Neural networks are tools that nest m ≥ 1 parametric functions together to
model an input x. In particular, those parametric functions are organized
into m layers of a mutually independent number of elementary computational
units called neurons that each take a weighted average of their inputs and
apply an activation function to generate an output. Well-known activation
functions are the sigmoid function, g(z) = [1+exp(−z)]−1, the softplus function,
g(z) = log(1 + exp(z)), and the rectifier function, g(z) = max(0, z). In feed-
forward networks, the only type of neural network used in this work, each of
those neurons—starting from the input layer—then feeds to at least one neuron
in a higher layer until the final layer, the output layer. In particular, a neural
network F will compute Fm(x), where
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Fj(ω) =
fj,θj (Fj−1(ω)) if 2 ≤ j ≤ mf1,θ1(ω) if j = 1 (2.23)
In this notation, Fj(ω) represents the output vector of layer j, indexed
from layer 1 (the layer after the input layer) to layer m (the output layer), and
fj,θj (ω) represents the function (used at each layer j) defined by the layer’s
parameters, θj , and applied to input ω. Because of how neural networks nest
functions into each other, generally speaking, higher layers (i.e., layers further
away from the input layer) model features that are more abstract than the
features modeled by lower layers. The 0-th layer is called the input layer, the
m-th layer is the output layer, and all intermediate layers are called hidden
layers.
In supervised learning, while training on a dataset
D = 〈(xi,yi) | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}〉 , (2.24)
the neural network F will use back-propagation to try to optimize each of its m
layers’ individual parameterizations, θj , so that the error between the ground
truths 〈yi | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}〉 and the final predictions 〈Fm(xi) | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}〉
is minimized.
As explained in §2.3, in single-label classification, softmax cross entropy is
used as the measuring stick for this error between ground truth and prediction,
just as sigmoid cross entropy is used in multi-label classification.
14
3 Datasets
3.1 Digit Recognition Dataset (MNIST)
The Modified National Institute of Standards and Technology (MNIST) dataset
is a subset of the NIST handwritten digit database that was preprocessed with
image classification learning techniques in mind [24]. The dataset occupies
approximately 12 MB in compressed form. Each image is a 28 × 28 pixel
grayscale image of a handwritten digit from 0 to 9 where each pixel takes a
value between 0 (background; white) and 255 (foreground; black), inclusive, and
is accompanied by exactly one label in the set {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}. The images were
produced by scaling NIST’s original images to a 20× 20 bounding box while
preserving aspect ratio and applying anti-aliasing, which is what necessitated
grayscale images instead of purely black and white, and then centered in a
28× 28 image.
The dataset contains a split of 60 thousand training images and 10 thousand
testing images spread mostly uniformly across the 10 classes as shown in
Figure 3.1 on the following page.
3.2 Reuters Newswire Topics Classification (RNTC)
The RNTC dataset contains 11,228 newswires from Reuters where each doc-
ument is encoded as a sequence of word indexes by frequency in the entire
dataset and is labeled to fall into exactly one of 46 topics. The dataset occupies
approximately 2.1 MB on disk. We then transform this dataset by recoding the
document features as 1000 binary features, each of which encodes whether the
document possesses one of the top 1000 most frequent words. We then randomly
select 80% of the dataset to be the training data and use the remaining 20% to
15
























Figure 3.1: Distribution of MNIST labels.
be testing data. We use the same random number generator seed throughout all
our experiments so the training and testing data are consistent. The distribution
of documents into categories is shown in Figure 3.2 on the next page. The
prominence of labels 3 and 4 show that the RNTC dataset is not nearly as
uniformly distributed as the MNIST dataset.
3.3 Reuters Corpus Volume I (RCV1)
The RCV1 dataset contains 804,414 manually categorized newswire stories by
Reuters, Ltd. Specifically, we use the RCV1-v2 dataset [25], a corrected version
of the original dataset, RCV1-v1 [36]. The dataset occupies approximately 530
MB in compressed form.
The creators of the RCV1-v2 dataset recommend that the training data
























Figure 3.2: Distribution of RNTC labels.
August 20 and August 31, 1996) and the testing dataset be the remaining
781,265 documents (i.e., articles published between September 1, 1996, and
August 19, 1997). They argue that this chronological training-testing split is
superior to a random split because most real-world classification tasks will train
using currently available samples and will be expected to make predictions
about future samples. Surprisingly, the distribution of documents appearing in
each label is nearly equal using the aforementioned training-testing split (see
Figure 3.3 on page 19).
Each document possesses 47,236 features, where non-zero features con-
tain cosine-normalized, logarithmically-scaled term frequency-inverse document
frequency (tf-idf) vectors. Only 0.16% of the all features across all 804,414
documents are non-zero.
Each document is labeled with at least one topic code, which represents
major subjects of the document. The four possible topic codes are CCAT
(Corporate/Industrial), ECAT (Economics), GCAT (Government/Social), and
MCAT (Markets). Each topic code is then hierarchically divided into several
industry codes and region codes for a total of 103 possible labels, combining
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topic, industry, and region codes. Each document must be classified into at least
one and at most four topic codes and may only fall into a narrower industry or
region code if it is already classified into the parent topic code.
For our purposes, we choose to disregard documents’ industry and region
codes and concern ourselves only with documents’ classification into the four
topic codes [45, page 331]. This then becomes a multi-label classification problem
where each document falls between one and four classes, inclusive. Figure 3.3
on the next page shows the distribution of how many documents are classified
labeled with one class versus more than one class.
3.4 Summary
Table 3.1 contains a summary of all the dataset characteristics outlined previ-
ously.
Dataset Training Testing Features Labels TypeSize Size
MNIST 60,000 10,000 784 10 Single-label
RNTC 8,982 2,246 1,000 46 Single-label
RCV1 23,149 781,265 47,236 4 Multi-label
Table 3.1: Summary of dataset characteristics.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of RCV1 labels. Separated by the number of individual
classes that each label collectively represents. The labels are shown here
in a binary encoding, where a 1 in the i-th position from the left in the
label name indicates that the label classifies documents into the i-th class.
Conversely, a 0 represents that the label does not classify documents
into the i-th class.
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4 System Design and Implementation
4.1 Multiple Parameter Server Design
We detail the theoretical background surrounding a privacy-supporting, multiple-
server system whose agents cooperate to collectively minimize a target function.
4.1.1 Obfuscation during Gradient Uploads
In this work, we implement a multiple-server architecture (see Figure 4.4 on
page 41 for example topologies) in which gradients uploaded by all workers are
intentionally perturbed in order to hide the cost function on which they are
based [14] and parameter servers periodically perform an element-wise average
of their parameters with their neighbors at each consensus step. This system has
C ≥ 1 workers and and S ≥ 1 parameter servers, where each worker i possesses
dataset Di and has access to a convex cost function fDi(θ) : X → R, where
X ⊆ RP is the set of all feasible parameter vectors, and P = |θ| is the number
of parameters we are optimizing over. The system is interested in finding








In this architecture, the worker-server topology and server-server topology
are both arbitrary and time-varying, so workers are connected to different
parameter servers every iteration and parameter servers can also change their
connectedness, meaning parameter servers can have a different set of neighbors
every consensus step. Each worker i must send their obfuscated gradients to at
least one parameter server j over a period of ∆ steps, however [14, Assumption
5]. At each iteration k, each parameter server locally maintains Ck, the set of
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workers connected to the parameter server at iteration k. Likewise, each worker
locally maintains Sk, the set of parameter servers connected to it at iteration k.
The original system assumes [14, Assumption 3] that each worker’s objective
function fDi(θ) : X → R is convex and continuously differentiable over the
feasible parameter set, X , and that there exist scalars L1, L2, . . . , LC such that,
∀k, ∀j, ∀i,
‖∇fDi(θkj )‖ ≤ Li (4.2)
where θkj is parameter server j’s local estimate of the optimal parameter vector
at iteration k.
At each iteration k, each worker i also maintains a weight matrix Wi,k
of size P × S such that each worker’s weight matrix, summed over all steps
between consecutive multiples of ∆ (inclusive-exclusive), has a row sum of
M > 0, a shared constant between all workers [14, Assumption 7]. Each (p, j)-
th entry of Wi,k represents the multiplicative weight applied by worker i to
the p-th gradient sent to server j at iteration k. Note that the j-th column
of Wi,k is zero if (but not only if) worker i is not connected to parameter
server j at iteration k. Formally, the summation restriction on Wi,k is defined




1S×1 = M 1P×1 (4.3)
where 1S×1 is a S × 1 matrix filled with ones. Note that there is no restriction
on how any individual (p, j)-th entry of Wi,k is chosen; the restriction only
exists the sum of consecutive Wi,k matrices between multiples of ∆.
The workers secondly maintain a noise matrix δi,k of size P×S such that each
worker’s weight matrix, summed over all steps between consecutive multiples
of ∆ (inclusive-exclusive), has a row sum of 0, a shared constant between all
workers. Each (p, j)-th entry of δi,k represents the additive weight applied by
worker i to the p-th gradient sent to server j at iteration k. Note that the j-th
column of δi,k is zero if (but not only if) worker i is not connected to parameter
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server j at iteration k. Formally, the summation restriction on δi,k is defined as




1S×1 = 0P×1 (4.4)
Also, the sum of the magnitudes of each weight used over a period of
∆ iterations is also upper-bounded by another shared constant M ′ > 0 [14,




1S×1 ≤M ′ 1P×1 (4.5)
where |Wi,κ| denotes the matrix produced by taking element-wise absolute
values of each element in the Wi,κ matrix.
In total, at iteration k, worker i will not upload to parameter server j
the exact gradient ∇fDi(θkj ) but will perturb each individual gradient and
instead upload a “modified gradient” vector gi,j,k whose elements are defined








































j-th column of matrix A.
At every consensus step, each parameter can possess a different set of
neighbors, as long as the parameter servers form a connected component [14,
Assumption 6]. At each iteration k, the parameter servers share a common,
doubly-stochastic matrix Bk of size S × S. That is, each element of Bk is
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between 0 and 1, inclusive, that each row of Bk sums to 1, and that each column
of Bk sums to 1. The entry in the j-th row and j′-th column of Bk is zero if
(but not only if) parameter server j is not connected to parameter server j′
at iteration k. Established methods for creating Bk are listed in [16, Section
3.1]. Consensus steps occur periodically so that there is an integer multiple of
∆ steps between any two consecutive consensus steps, during which parameter









to θkj , the j-th parameter server’s estimate of the optimal parameter vector at
step k, where (Bk)j,j′ indicates the entry in the j-th row and j′-th column of
S × S matrix Bk.
These algorithms for the workers’ and parameter servers’ executions are
presented in Algorithms 3 to 4 on pages 23–24.
Algorithm 3 Interleaved consensus, parameter server [14, Algorithm 2]
Require: j, an index number for this parameter server between 1 and S
Require: ∆, the number of iterations between consensus steps
1: Initialize θ0j
2: Initialize k ← 0
3: repeat
4: for all i ∈ Ck do . loop over my neighbor workers in step k
5: Upload θkj to worker i
6: Download gi,j,k from worker i when ready
7: end for




9: if 0 ≡ k mod ∆ then














15: k ← k + 1
16: until convergence
17: return optimized parameter vector θkj
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Algorithm 4 Interleaved consensus, worker node [14, Algorithm 1]
Require: i, an index number for this worker between 1 and C
Require: the local dataset Di
1: Initialize k ← 0
2: repeat
3: Choose weight matrix Wi,k locally
4: Choose noise matrix δi,k locally
5: for all j ∈ Sk do . loop over my parameter servers in step k
6: Download θkj from parameter server j













9: Upload gi,j,k to parameter server j
10: end for
11: k ← k + 1
12: until convergence
We know that if ∀k ≥ 0, αk > 0, if αk ≤ αk+1, if the sequence of αk is
not summable but is square-summable (that is,
∑∞





∞), and if the previous assumptions hold, then the average parameter vector
converges to the optimal θ∗ [14, Theorem 5].
4.1.2 Privacy Guarantees
The authors of the original work claim that multiplying each individual gradient
by a random positive or negative weight and further introducing a random
positive or negative additive noise work together to increase workers’ dataset
privacy by disallowing parameter servers to learn information from workers’ gra-
dient uploads since parameter servers no longer receive perfect information [14,
Section 5]. The information that the researchers specifically intend to hide is
each worker’s individual cost function, fDi(θ). We show in this work that even
workers’ perturbed gradients can potentially reveal some information about Di,
the dataset on which the cost function is defined.
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4.1.3 Obfuscation during Parameter Server State Sharing
We also implement a set of strategies [16, Algorithms 0–3] used to obfuscate the
parameters that parameter servers share with each other during consensus steps.
We modify the context of the algorithms as presented originally to support
sharing multiple perturbed parameters concurrently. The original system is
modeled as a P2P system, which is equivalent to a topology with S parameter
servers and exactly S workers, where each worker sends unperturbed gradients
to the same parameter server throughout its lifetime.
The first strategy, presented in Algorithm 5, is an unperturbed strategy,
identical to the strategy introduced in §4.1.1. In this strategy, at each consensus
step k, which takes place consistently at some non-zero multiple of ∆ steps,
each parameter server j performs a weighted average of the parameters it has
access to using weights defined from Bk.
Algorithm 5 Standard consensus (DGD) [16, Algorithm 0]
Require: j, an index number for this parameter server between 1 and S
Require: θkj , this server’s current local parameter estimate
Require: Nk, the union of {j} and the adjacent parameter servers at step k







In the second strategy, presented in Algorithm 6 on the next page, the
parameters shared between parameter servers are perturbed additively by a
noise vector, dkj , generated such that summing this noise vector across all
parameter servers produces the zero vector. Each parameter server perturbs its
parameters and sends the same perturbed parameters to all neighbors. There
are many ways to generate such a set of noise vectors, but one simple method,
outlined in Line 5, is included directly into the rest of the algorithm. Each
individual element of skj,j′ is obtained from an arbitrary probability distribution,
but must be bounded in magnitude based on a privacy budget. We intend to
place ρ-bounds on each of the p elements in dkj . Specifically, ∀p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , P},
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The privacy budget ρ ≥ 0 is naturally closely tied with the amount of privacy
parameter servers receive because it dictates how strongly they can perturb the
parameter vectors they share with each other.
Algorithm 6 Randomized State Sharing (RSS) consensus [16, Algorithm 1]
Require: j, an index number for this parameter server between 1 and S
Require: θkj , this server’s current parameter estimate
Require: αk, the learning rate currently being used at workers
Require: Nk, the union of {j} and the adjacent parameter servers at step k
1: for all j′ ∈ Nk do
2: Upload random vector skj,j′ of length P to parameter server j′
3: end for














6: θ̄kj ← θkj + αkd
j
k









In the third strategy, presented in Algorithm 7 on the following page, each
parameter server sends a differently perturbed parameter estimate to each of its
neighbors such that the perturbations used by the parameter server during that
iteration sum to the zero vector for each individual parameter in the parameter
vector and such that the perturbation applied to each element is ρ-bounded.







and, similar to Equation 4.9, we require ∀p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , P}, ∀j′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |Nk|},
− ρ ≤ (Dj,k)p,j′ ≤ ρ (4.12)
where Dj,k is a matrix of size P × |Nk| in which the (p, j′)-th element dictates
which additive weight parameter server j will apply to parameter p on its way
to parameter server j′.
Algorithm 7 RSS–Locally Balanced (RSS-LB) consensus [16, Algorithm 3]
Require: j, an index number for this parameter server between 1 and S
Require: θkj , this server’s current parameter estimate
Require: αk, the learning rate currently being used at workers
Require: Nk, the union of {j} and the adjacent parameter servers at step k
1: Generate random matrix Dj,k
2: for all j′ ∈ Nk do





4: Upload asynchronously ϑkj,j′ to parameter server j′
5: end for
6: Download all received perturbed parameter estimates ∀j′ ∈ Nk: ϑkj′,j







There are two key differences between RSS and RSS-LB [16, Section 3.3]:
1. In RSS, each parameter server only perturbs its parameters once and sends
the same perturbed estimates to all its neighbors, whereas in RSS-LB, each
parameter server perturbs its parameters uniquely for each neighbor and
shares those estimates.
2. In RSS, parameter servers add perturbations to their own parameter
estimates, whereas in RSS-LB they do not.
4.2 Implementation
We simulate all worker-server architectures by running each learning participant
(workers and parameter servers, alike) as individual, isolated Unix processes.
Doing so prevents workers from accidentally making a memory access to another
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worker’s parameters and prevents parameter servers from illegally inspecting
workers’ datasets, much how a real-world realization of this system would behave.
Each worker and parameter server is run as a Python 3.5.3 script and
leverages TensorFlow [1] to compute gradients (Line 4 in Algorithm 2 on page 9)
and apply pre-computed gradients (Line 6 in Algorithm 1 on page 9). Gradients
are sent over the network using Python 3’s built-in xmlrpc module. Parameter
servers spin up an XML-RPC server on a selected port and listen for:
1. requests to download current parameter values (Line 3 in Algorithm 2 on
page 9)
2. gradients uploaded by workers to the parameter server (Line 5 in Algo-
rithm 2 on page 9 and Line 3 in Algorithm 1 on page 9).
To facilitate the sharing of parameters between parameter servers (see §4.1.3),
we also introduce a central server whose IP address is hard-coded into each
parameter server. To simulate exchanges of parameters using either the RSS and
RSS-LB schemes, parameter servers send raw, unperturbed parameter vectors
to the central server, which then applies the protocols introduced by RSS and
RSS-LB to mimic the output of running those algorithms on a per-server level
and the broadcasts the perturbed parameter vector to the parameter servers
that ought to receive them (i.e., the topological neighbors at step k). This is, of
course, a violation of the true implementation requirements of the algorithm,
but as explained in §4.3.1.2, it was used to reduce code complexity and network
overhead.
The codebase used to model the entire system is 4,870 lines of pure Python 3
code and makes heavy use of third-party, C-based numerical processing libraries,
including NumPy 1.13.0, SciPy 0.19.0, and TensorFlow 1.1.
4.2.1 Deviation from Theory
We note that our system never performs any checks to ensure that the assumption
outlined in Equation 4.2 on page 21 is satisfied nor does it check the Lipschitz
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continuity of the gradients. In neural network problems, we also implicitly
drop the assumption that the cost function is convex and are content with
converging to a local minimum since converging to a global minimum often
leads to overfitting [9].
Our system also deviates from the assumption that the sequence of αk is not
summable but is square-summable (that is,
∑∞













0.01 if k ≤ 1000
0.01
k − 1000 else,
(4.14)
often are too difficult to tune correctly to observe satisfactory convergence
results. Instead, we opt to either use a fixed αk throughout the lifetime of the










where α0 > 0 is the initial learning rate, r such that 0 < r < 1 is the learning
rate decay, q ≥ 1 is a decay scaling factor, and αmin ≥ 0 is the lowest learning
rate we will allow.
While we define θ ∈ RP , the original system proposal [14] instead defines θ ∈
X , where X ⊆ RP is the set of feasible parameter vectors. The original system
uses projected gradient descent and projects each iteration’s θk+1 (obtained
from Line 6 in Algorithm 1 on page 9) onto X . We elect to forego this expensive
projection step and instead assume that X = RP .
Lastly, our system is only capable of handling time-varying topologies—
particularly, topologies that vary randomly with time—in an asynchronous
setting, where parameter servers do not wait for a fixed number of workers—
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specifically where parameter server j does not wait for its |Ck| workers—to send
their gradients before proceeding to iteration k + 1. Furthermore, because the
analysis results hold only in synchronous settings [14], we choose to conduct all
evaluations using synchronous systems, which forces us to use fixed topologies.
4.3 Network Bandwidth Conservation
Initial benchmarking revealed that the bottleneck of the system’s wall clock
time to convergence was the overhead from transferring data over the network.
We present our implementation strategies to minimize this cost using manual
schemes to re-encode the data (§4.3.1) and blanket strategies to minimize the
number of bits transmitted using general-purpose algorithms (§4.3.2).
4.3.1 Context-Aware Compression (CAC)
This section treats schemes we implemented manually so agents in the system
could transmit necessary information to each other while consuming minimal
amounts of network bandwidth. We show the impact of our solutions in Fig-
ure 4.1a on page 33.
4.3.1.1 Worker-Server Communication
Our first focus turned to the minimization of network bandwidth utilization
while transferring gradients and parameters (henceforth “payload”) across the
network at every iteration.
In all cases of worker-server communication, whenever the payload is sent
across the network, each individual element (individual gradient or parameter)
must be accompanied by an integer representing at which index in the payload
the element belongs at. Our optimization efforts focused on minimizing this
payload-metadata pair’s size by combining lossy compression of the payload
with an optimal, lossless encoding of the index metadata accompanying the
payload.
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Lossy Payload Compression (LPC) At each iteration, workers download a
vector of parameters from the parameter servers and upload a vector of gradients.
In both of these cases, an array of floating point numbers is being sent across
the network. Secondly, our system supports the upload of partial gradients,
meaning workers may upload a subset of their gradient vector and similarly
parameter servers may only make a fraction of their parameters available for
download. In these cases, we must pair each gradient or parameter with the
index at which that gradient or parameter exists. We can now treat the vector
of indices and the vector of floating point number as two independent targets
of size compression.
Floating point numbers in TensorFlow can be 32- or 64-bit floats (i.e.,
single- or double-prediction floats, respectively), but inspection of TensorFlow’s
implementation [1] reveals that the authors are content with resorting to 16-bit
floating point (i.e., half-precision) numbers when sending floats across networks
to other devices. Inspired by this, our first technique to minimize the transmitted
number of bits was to always down-cast our gradients and parameters into half-
precision floats during transmission and resignedly accept any loss of accuracy
that accompanies it.
Lossless Metadata Compression (LMC) Our second technique to com-
press data size was to discard the view that we would be sending a vector of
zero-based indices in tandem with the gradients but that we would rather be
sending a vector of booleans in place of indices, where a value of True represents
that corresponding gradient is present but a value of False represents that the
corresponding gradient is absent. As a vector of booleans, our representations
of indices can be painlessly shortened into a bit vector, where each index now
occupies only one bit instead of 32. The impact of encoding integers as a bitvec-
tor becomes even more noticeable if the number of parameters in the model
exceeds 232 ≈ 4.3× 109 and indices have to be represented as 64-bit integers.
This technique is not always optimal, however. Consider the case where
the model stored at the worker contains 220 ≈ 1.05 × 106 of parameters, but
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at a particular iteration, the worker has elected to send exactly three of these
parameters using partial gradient upload. Representing this vector of indices as
a bitvector would take 220 bits—one bit per index, regardless of whether the bit
is True or False—but sending the indices as raw 32-bit integer values would
only take 3 × 32 = 96 bits, since this vector would contain only one element
(since the remaining 220 − 3 indices are absent).
The converse case holds a similar argument. Consider the case where the
model stored at the worker once again contains 220 parameters, but at a particular
iteration, the worker has elected to send all parameters except three. Representing
this vector of indices as a bitvector would once again take 220 bits, and sending
the indices as raw 32-bit integer values would take (220−3)×32 ≈ 220×25 = 225
bits. Regardless of how the vector of indices are compressed, the vector of
gradients will absolutely have to contain 220−3 elements, but if the index vector
can be expressed as an inverse (i.e., indices that are present indicate gradients
that are absent) then the index vector can be transmitted using just 3×32 = 96
bits, one 32-bit integer per excluded index.
Eliminating Zero-Magnitude Gradients We implicitly assumed above
that a missing index is equivalent to a zero gradient. For example, when a
parameter server receives a vector of indices and a vector of gradients with
some indices missing, the parameter server can safely pretend that the absent
gradients were zero in magnitude and can add a gradient of zero to any of
its parameters with no problems. As a result, our system can automatically
remove gradients that are zero before sending them by treating them as “absent”
gradients. In MNIST learning models, most gradient vectors only contain 50%
nonzero entries, and in RCV1 gradients, that number can be as low as 1%. The
results of compacting the index and gradient vectors using the best possible
technique are shown in Figure 4.1a on the next page. This technique is useful
even if multiplicative weights from the Wi,k matrix are applied but ceases to
be useful once additive noises from the δi,k matrix are incorporated.
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(a) Network load using CAC for gradient uploads us-
ing 64-bit payloads and metadata. Sparsity de-
notes the fraction of eliminable, zero-magnitude
gradients.




























(b) Network load using CUC on 64-bit payloads and
metadata. The effect of CUC becomes less ap-
parent as more annihilatory CAC techniques are
applied.
Figure 4.1: Network bandwidth reduction benchmarking.
4.3.1.2 Server-Server Communication
In an undirected graph Gk = (V,Ek) of parameter servers, where V is the set
of all parameter servers and Ek is the set of all edges connecting neighboring
parameter servers at iteration k, performing any of the DGD, RSS, or RSS-LB
algorithms, performing one consensus step would require Θ (P |Ek|) bytes to be
transferred at each iteration k amongst all parameter servers in Gk. Although
creating a central server to facilitate movement of perturbed parameter estimates
across the network violates the very basic nature of a distributed system, it has
been indispensable in simulations because it not only reduces the communication
overhead amongst parameter servers to Θ (P |V |) but also heavily decreases
code complexity. In fact, since Gk must always form a connected component [14,




, which suggests that for
the vast majority of graphs Gk, an architecture with a centralized parameter
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exchange server would require less bandwidth than one without.
4.3.2 Context-Unaware Compression (CUC)
We also apply an off-the-shelf compression algorithm to our index-gradient
payload to further reduce the number of bytes transferred over the network. We
benchmarked several compression algorithms readily available through Python’s
built-in libraries (see Figure 4.1b on the preceding page) and elected to use
zlib as our compression algorithm of choice. Although the impact compression
makes seems minimal, we believe that the CPU overhead of computing the
compressed file is preferable to transferring those bytes over the network.
4.4 Implementation Verification
We separately test our implementations of gradient descent (§4.4.1) and our
implementation of consensus (§4.4.2).
4.4.1 Gradient Sharing Verification
To ensure that our distributed gradient descent implementation was correctly
implemented, we created a worker-server topology of three workers connected to
one parameter server, which followed Algorithms 1 to 2 on page 9, respectively.
We conducted tests on one simple, nonquadratic multivariable minimization
problem [5] and another three “carefully coded test functions. . . designed. . .
for testing the reliability and robustness of unconstrained optimization soft-
ware” [31].
In the following tests, we seek





In each unconstrained optimization problem, we are provided with n, the
length of the parameter vector; m, the number of equations to perform minimiza-
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tion over; θ0, an initial guess of the minimum; and each function, fi : Rn → R,
to minimize summed squares of.
(a) Quadratic function: n = 1, m = 20
fi(θ) = αi(θ1 − βi), ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} (4.17)
such that ∀i, αi, βi ∈ R.














If we consider the sequences αi =
√
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. Minimum is at θ∗ ≈ 〈59.70095〉.
(b) Nonquadratic function [5, page 200]: n = 2, m = 3
f1(θ) = (θ1 − 2)2 (4.20)
f2(θ) = (θ1 − 2)θ2 (4.21)
f3(θ) = θ2 + 1 (4.22)
Initial guess θ0 = 〈1, 1〉. Minimum is at θ∗ = 〈2,−1〉.
(c) Rosenbrock function [31, Function 1]: n = 2, m = 2
f1(θ) = 10(θ2 − θ21) (4.23)
f2(θ) = 1− θ1 (4.24)




. Minimum is at θ∗ = 〈1, 1〉.
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(d) Helical valley function [31, Function 7]: n = 3, m = 3




















θ21 + θ22 − 1
)
(4.27)
f3(θ) = θ3 (4.28)
Initial guess θ0 = 〈−1, 0, 0〉. Minimum is at θ∗ = 〈1, 0, 0〉.
(e) Powell singular function [31, Function 13]: n = 4, m = 4
f1(θ) = θ1 + 10θ2 (4.29)
f2(θ) =
√
5(θ3 − θ4) (4.30)
f3(θ) = (θ2 − 2θ3)2 (4.31)
f4(θ) =
√
10(θ1 − θ4)2 (4.32)
Initial guess θ0 = 〈3,−1, 0, 1〉. Minimum is at θ∗ = 〈0, 0, 0, 0〉.
The results of the gradient descent on this test suite of optimization problems
are presented in Table 4.1 on the following page, which shows that all functions
tested converge to the expected optima, although each test case required a
different learning rate and a different number of steps to converge sufficiently.
Note that this system has three workers that each download an identical set
of parameters from the parameter server in a synchronized fashion. Since the
workers have no dataset to define their loss function with, each worker sends
the same gradient to the parameter server. As a result, the magnitude of αk is
effectively tripled when compared to a system that tries to optimize the same
function but with only one worker.


















































0 −1.0 0.0 0.0
700 0.93896 0.34351 0.55664
1400 0.99707 0.077698 0.12347
2100 1.0 0.017242 0.02739
2800 1.0 0.0038261 0.006073
3500 1.0 0.00084829 0.0013466
4200 1.0 0.00018823 0.00029874
4900 1.0 0.000041723 0.00006628








0 3.0 −1.0 0.0 1.0
18000 0.029175 −0.0029163 0.014534 0.014549
36000 0.020554 −0.0020561 0.010246 0.010246
54000 0.016769 −0.0016775 0.0083542 0.0083542
72000 0.014511 −0.0014505 0.0072289 0.0072327
90000 0.01297 −0.001297 0.0064621 0.0064659
108000 0.011841 −0.0011835 0.0059013 0.0059013
126000 0.010956 −0.0010958 0.0054626 0.0054626
144000 0.010246 −0.0010242 0.0051079 0.0051079
162000 0.0096588 −0.0009656 0.0048141 0.0048141
(e) Powell singular, αk = 2× 10−3
Table 4.1: Verification of gradient-sharing algorithms. Results based upon parameter
convergence inspection on a test suite of unconstrained optimization
functions.
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αk = 2.6× 10−4
αk = 6.6× 10−4
αk = 1.7× 10−3
αk = 7.5× 10−3
αk = 4.9× 10−2
αk = 1.0× 100
Figure 4.2: Varying learning rates. Effect of varying learning rates in a system with
one worker and one parameter server training on MNIST data using a
logistic regression model with a batch size of 128 images. Systems with
higher learning rates reach high accuracies quickly but maintain a larger
convergence error.
larger values of αk) results in faster convergence rates. Our system successfully
meets this expected result as seen in Figure 4.2. This system has one worker that
performs no perturbations before uploading its gradients and one parameter
server working together to learn a logistic model used for MNIST class prediction.
We see that higher learning rates push the system faster to high accuracies
(the worker with learning rate αk = 1.0 reaches > 90% accuracy in just 0.027
epochs), but excessively large constant learning rates force the system into a
state with a higher steady state error since the system is unable to make a small
enough step toward the optimum.
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4.4.2 State-Sharing Verification
We secondly test to ensure that our state-sharing algorithms are also imple-
mented correctly. We do so by running a distributed optimization problem
on two datasets, MNIST and RNTC, and ensure that all algorithms converge
correctly using a privacy budget of ρ = 3 (see Equation 4.9 on page 26).
From Figure 4.3 on the next page, we see that the RSS and RSS-LB perturba-
tions of MNIST learning algorithms converge to within ε = 0.01 of a centralized
solution (i.e., a solution with one worker training locally on all data with no
parameter server). Somewhat surprisingly, RSS and RSS-LB have better accura-
cies than the DGD consensus algorithms using a K5 topology (see Figure 4.4f on
page 41) on RNTC data, but we see that in the remaining experiments that
DGD performs with greater accuracy than do the other consensus algorithms, as
expected.
4.5 Evaluation
In the system we implemented, we test the correctness on the MNIST dataset
using two learning models: a simple multinomial logistic regression model
(equivalent to a “shallow“ neural network with no hidden layers) and a deep
neural network (DNN).
4.5.1 Standard Parameter Server
Our first results use a WC topology (see Figure 4.4a on page 41), where one
parameter server (following Algorithm 1 on page 9) is connected to all worker
nodes (following Algorithm 2 on page 9). We see in Figure 4.5 on page 42 that
using more workers actually sees faster convergence rates in MNIST data when
using either a logistic or a DNN model. This is likely due to the data being
uniformly sharded across the workers; in one epoch, a system with more worker
simply sees more training images and thus can converge to the optimum with
iterations overall.
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Topology = K5 (fully connected)












































Figure 4.3: Verification of state-sharing algorithms. Inspection of final accuracies
of DGD, RSS, and RSS-LB consensus algorithms on training a deep neural
network on MNIST (top) and a multinomial logistic regression on RNTC
(bottom) using a cycle graph of P2P nodes (left) and a fully connected
graph (right). Data is distributed uniformly across the P2P nodes (i.e.,
no federation of data) and consensus is performed after every 40 local
gradient descent steps.
4.5.2 Partial Gradient Uploads and Partial Parameter
Downloads
We also recreate Figure 4.5a on page 42 in Figure 4.6b on page 43 using
partial gradient uploads and parameter downloads and still observe remarkable
convergence rates. Specifically, instead of uploading the entire gradient vector
to the parameter server, each worker will only upload the 10% of gradients that
are the largest in magnitude [38]. Upon receiving these gradients for specific
parameters, the parameter server will update the recency of those parameters







(a) WC topology, with one pa-
rameter server and C work-
ers.
1 2 3 · · · C
1 2
(b) QC topology, with two parame-











(c) C5 (cycle) topology. No relation to C,

































(f) K5 (fully connected) topology.
Figure 4.4: Various topologies used throughout. Red squares indicate parameter
servers; blue circles indicate workers.
upon request, breaking ties arbitrarily.
We examine the effect of partial gradient uploads on a different topology.
Note that, in this topology, the parameter servers are fully connected; that
is, each parameter server is a neighbor of all other parameter servers, which
greatly improves the strength of the DGD consensus algorithm used to average
the parameters between the three parameter servers here. The strongly connect-
edness is also why we only have one trendline per experiment instead having one
for each parameter server. Since the DGD algorithm ensures that all parameter
servers have identical parameters after consensus so their accuracies will also be
41




















(a) Logistic regression model.





















Figure 4.5: MNIST convergence, logistic regression and DNN models. Convergence
results on MNIST using multiple workers with non-federated data and
batch sizes of 128 in a wheel topology where workers upload and download
100% of gradients and parameters, respectively. Notice the stark difference
in the x-axis scale.
identical. Figure 4.7a on page 44 shows that in certain topologies with federated
data, uploading too few gradients will not lead to proper convergence results,
but exceeding a certain threshold will outperform a vanilla topology with one
worker and one parameter server, as shown in Figure 4.7b.
4.5.3 Gradient Obfuscation
We examine the effect of gradient perturbations (§4.1.1) as per Equation 4.7 on
page 22. We design a topology of one parameter server and three workers, each
of which possess a different handwritten image label. We use a batch size of 32
and a learning rate of
αk =




















































Figure 4.6: MNIST convergence, varying upload/download rates. Convergence results
on MNIST using a logistic model and batch sizes of 128 in a wheel
topology where workers upload and download a smaller set of gradients
and parameters, respectively, at each iteration.
where α0 = 0.03, τ = 1.5× 105, and q = 1000. Figure 4.8a on page 45 highlights
why it is necessary to multiply each parameter by a different random weight and
to perturb each parameter by a different noise, as opposed to using the same
weight and/or the same noise for every element in the gradient vector. While
there is a definite departure from the no-perturbation curve, the remaining curves
are all clustered around each other, even with wildly different random weights
and very different additive noises. On the other hand, using a different weight
and different noise per parameter produces much more noticeable differences
between the convergence curves, as shown in Figure 4.8b on page 45. In all
figures in this work, we choose each random weight from an (approximately)
uniform distribution with symmetric bounds, and we choose each random noise
from a normal distribution with mean 0 and different variances. That is, ∀(p, j),
(Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−b, b) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (µ, σ
2), where U(b1, b2) denotes a uniform
distribution with bounds b1 and b2 for b1 < b2, and N (µ, σ2) denotes a normal
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(a) Convergence results using federated data with
varying upload/download rates.

























(b) Convergence results using uniformly distributed
data and a 10% upload/download rate.
Figure 4.7: MNIST convergence, SCC-3 topology. Convergence results on MNIST
using a logistic regression model in an SCC-3 topology.
distribution with mean µ and variance σ2.
We note that the “uniform” distribution from which the random weights are
chosen is approximately uniform in the sense that we choose weights iteratively
from a uniform distribution, making small adjustments to each incremental
distribution’s endpoints so that we can satisfy the guarantees in Equation 4.3.
We find that training a multilabel logistic regression on the RCV1 dataset
is particularly sensitive to gradient perturbations. We use a W15 topology and
assign each worker all the samples belonging to one selected label group. Recall
that the RCV1 dataset has four possible labels, leaving us with the possibilities
that one sample is labeled with at least one class but at most four classes.
We see from Figure 4.9b that a system with no gradient perturbation con-
verges quite quickly to a high accuracy, but even just a small multiplicative
perturbation in the range [−1, 1] dramatically reduces convergence rates. Sur-
prisingly, the converge rate does not further decline once weights are magnified,
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∼ N (0, 162)
(a) Convergence using one random weight and one
noise for all parameters sent to one parameter
server from the worker.































































































∼ N (0, 162)
(b) Convergence using one random weight and one
noise for each outgoing parameter sent from the
worker.
Figure 4.8: Per-server vs. per-parameter perturbations. Convergence rates of per-
server vs. per-parameter perturbations using three workers with federated
samples and one parameter server training on MNIST data using a logistic
regression model with batch sizes of 32. ∆ = 5.
even 10-fold, and can even be seen to marginally improve from Figure 4.9a.
Note that in this set of experiments, we applied no additive noise to any of the
transmitted gradients.
4.5.4 Effect of Data Separation
One of the benefits of using a distributed system is having the advantage of
being able to split data non-uniformly across different nodes. We examine the
effect of convergence rates on federating samples by their classification label so
that the number of hops needed for parameter information to permeate across
the graph is minimal and maximal.
We take a C5 graph of P2P nodes (i.e., one P2P node represents a pair
of a single parameter server and a single worker that each send unperturbed
45













(a) Focused on first few epochs.

















W ∼ U(−1, 1)
W ∼ U(−2, 2)
W ∼ U(−5, 5)
W ∼ U(−10, 10)
(b) Full scale.
Figure 4.9: RCV1 convergence against degrees of W. Uses W15 topology with feder-
ated data using batch sizes of 32 and various multiplicative weights but no





gradients and parameters back and forth) and divide data three different ways:
d = 0 Each node individually holds data that has all possible labels (see Fig-
ures 4.10a and 4.11a).
d ≤ 1 Taking the union of all the data held at any one node with the data held
collectively at all nodes at most one hop away produces a dataset that
contains all possible labels (see Figures 4.10b and 4.11b).
d ≤ 2 Taking the union of all the data held at any one node with the data held
collectively at all nodes at most two hops away produces a dataset that
contains all possible labels (see Figures 4.10c and 4.11c).
Since a C5 graph has a diameter of 2, having d ≤ 2 is the configuration in which
labels are maximally separated. Note that producing a dataset that contains all
possible labels is not necessarily equivalent to producing a dataset that contains
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all samples. That is, it is not necessary that one node be able to reconstruct
the entire dataset; rather, it only needs to be able to reconstruct just enough to
have a sufficient number of samples of each label to train on.
In Figure 4.10 on the next page, we see that as data is distributed so that it
takes more and more hops to reach all possible labels, it takes drastically more
epochs in order to reach the same levels of accuracy. The allocation of federated
labels per worker is detailed in Figure 4.11 on page 49.
4.5.5 Gradient and Parameter Obfuscation
We study a series of systems that are all arranged in a star topology (see
Figure 4.4d on page 41) where workers train on the RNTC dataset using a
logistic regression model and have each randomly been allocated a 15 fraction of
the training data. Figure 4.12 on page 50 and Table 4.2 on page 49 show the
effect of varying the privacy budget, ρ, on the converged accuracy.
We see that increasing both the span of the range of values each element in
Wi,k can take on as well as increasing the privacy budget, ρ, of the consensus
algorithms ultimately force the system into a steady state that is less accurate
than a centralized solution. Interestingly, we also notice that the same increase
in ρ produces a much larger negative impact on systems performing convergence
through RSS-LB than it does on systems performing convergence through RSS.
4.5.6 Federated Data
We study the impact of federating the dataset. That is, dividing the samples in
the training dataset so that each worker only has a strict subset of the possible
labels. In these tests, we use the RNTC dataset because it has 46 possible labels,
allowing for high degrees of federation.
We use a WC topology, where ∀C ∈ {3, 6, 12, 23, 46} and distribute the
training labels between each of the C workers as evenly as possible. As seen in
Figure 4.13, all topologies converge towards the optimum very quickly, and the
results parallel the conclusions made from Figure 4.5. The results in Figure 4.14,
47



















(a) d = 0.














(b) d ≤ 1.














(c) d ≤ 2.
Figure 4.10: Convergence against degrees of data separation. Convergence on MNIST
data using a DNN model with varying degrees of data separation from
each P2P worker using αk = 0.01 and with batch sizes of 32. Notice
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γ ∈ {0,1, . . . ,9}
































(c) d ≤ 2.
Figure 4.11: Placement of labels for data separation. Outlines federation scheme for
Figure 4.10.
Consensus W ∼ U(−2, 2) W ∼ U(−5, 5)
DGD 73.51± 0.00% 71.76± 0.02%
RSS 73.82± 0.00% 71.82± 0.00%
RSS-LB 72.48± 0.57% 71.23± 0.19%
(a) ρ = 5.
Consensus W ∼ U(−2, 2) W ∼ U(−5, 5)
DGD 73.51± 0.00% 71.76± 0.02%
RSS 73.78± 0.00% 70.61± 0.00%
RSS-LB 70.54± 0.52% 69.44± 0.50%
(b) ρ = 10.
Consensus W ∼ U(−2, 2) W ∼ U(−5, 5)
DGD 73.51± 0.00% 71.76± 0.02%
RSS 61.74± 1.41% 61.67± 1.70%
RSS-LB 55.77± 3.07% 54.59± 1.77%
(c) ρ = 50.
Consensus W ∼ U(−2, 2) W ∼ U(−5, 5)
DGD 73.51± 0.00% 71.76± 0.02%
RSS 54.49± 2.81% 52.96± 4.28%
RSS-LB 48.01± 4.04% 48.01± 5.13%
(d) ρ = 100.
Table 4.2: Convergence against degrees of ρ and W. Final accuracies of Figure 4.12.
however, show that although systems that have their data spread between more
workers and that have workers who add perturbations to their gradients do
converge to the optimum eventually, they do so much more slowly and do so
much more erratically. These results echo the findings of Figures 4.8 and 4.10.
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DGD, W ∼ U(−2, 2)
RSS, W ∼ U(−2, 2)
RSS-LB, W ∼ U(−2, 2)
DGD, W ∼ U(−5, 5)
RSS, W ∼ U(−5, 5)
RSS-LB, W ∼ U(−5, 5)
(a) ρ = 5.















(b) ρ = 10.















(c) ρ = 50.















(d) ρ = 100.
Figure 4.12: Convergence against degrees of ρ and W. Convergence on RNTC
data using a logistic regression model with batch sizes of 32 with





. (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1
2).
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Figure 4.13: Federated RNTC data, no perturbation. Curve represents the parameter
server’s accuracy on the test dataset. Using batch size of 32. Training
data labels distributed as evenly as possible between the workers.
51
















































































Figure 4.14: Federated RNTC data, with perturbation. Curve represents the parame-
ter server’s accuracy on the test dataset. Using batch size of 32. Training
data labels distributed as evenly as possible between the workers.
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5 Adversarial Attack Vectors
As discussed in §4.1.2, the creators of the system that we implemented in this
work aim to hide information about the individual objective functions, fDi(·),
of each worker i. We pose that since each worker’s individual objective function
is derived from its private dataset Di, uncovering information about Di is a
very real threat to the privacy of workers’ objective functions. We introduce a
set of strategies for an adversary to extract information about any one worker’s
dataset given the gradients it produced.
Given today’s prevalence of and easy accessibility to proven encryption
techniques to transfer data across a network [12, 17], we assume that it is
impossible for a third-party to eavesdrop on or tamper with any communications
a particular worker has with its parameter servers. Instead, we consider a model
where parameter servers, themselves, become compromised by a single adversary
and attempt to extract additional information about their workers based on
the gradients received, in spite of any perturbations applied to the gradients
before being transmitted.
In our adversarial model, we assume that each worker i possesses a private
dataset Di, but we also assume the existence of a large public dataset, T ,
available to all parameter servers that is representative of the union of all data
held at workers. In our experiments, we use the each dataset’s testing data as
the so-called “public dataset” and use fractions of the training data as each
individual workers’ private Di. All parameter servers have access to the shared
public dataset and are free to use it however they desire.
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5.1 Active Corruption
If actively corrupting a parameter server, an adversary completely hijacks a
parameter server and can force arbitrary deviations from the parameter server
protocol. Consequently, the adversary can read and tamper with all internal
state information and can choose arbitrarily which parameter values to send to
which worker.
In the protocol outlined in Algorithm 3 on page 23, at step k, each parameter
server j maintains a single parameter vector or model, θkj , shared between all




j , and so on. Consider a
system with S = 1 parameter servers and C ≥ 2 workers in which a parameter
server wishes to learn information about each worker’s private dataset, Di. We
assume that each Di dataset contains data labeled with a strict subset of all
possible labels. In order to best be able to learn this private information, instead
of maintaining a single model that it serves indiscriminately to all workers, the
parameter server ought to maintain C independent models and feed worker i
the i-th independent model at each iteration. Algorithm 8 on the next page
explicitly takes advantage of this observation, and actively corrupted parameter
servers would do well to follow Algorithm 8 instead of Algorithm 3. Workers,
of course, must continue to follow Algorithm 4 on page 24 since they remain
wholly unaware that the parameter server has deviated from the protocol.
Algorithm 8 departs from Algorithm 3 most significantly in that Algorithm 8
no longer creates a consensus model. That is, each individual model Ai will
be very highly trained on Di but will never have seen data samples from other
workers. To illustrate, this is because a system with S = 1 actively corrupted
parameter servers and C ≥ 1 workers is equivalent to a set of C independent
systems, where each system contains one parameter server and exactly one
worker which trains on nothing but its own dataset. Our results on running
Algorithm 8 in a system training on the MNIST dataset also showed that even
taking the “average” Ai over all i did not perform well on the MNIST testing
dataset suggesting that an actively corrupted parameter server cannot even
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Algorithm 8 Adversarial interleaved consensus
Require: j, an index number for this parameter server between 1 and S
Require: ∆, the number of iterations between consensus steps
1: Initialize k ← 0
2: Initialize A ← ∅ as the set of all workers’ individual models
3: repeat
4: for all i ∈ Ck do . loop over my neighbor workers in step k
5: if i /∈ A then
6: Initialize parameter vector Ai
7: end if
8: Upload Ai to worker i as if it is θkj
9: Download gi,j,k from worker i when ready
10: Ai ← Ai − αkgi,j,k
11: end for
12: if 0 ≡ k mod ∆ then
13: Supply garbage parameter vector θ̄kj to consensus algorithm
14: Discard the return value of the consensus algorithm
15: end if
16: k ← k + 1
17: until convergence of each Ai
18: return Ai to each worker i that requests it
forge a somewhat well-trained consensus model after deviating to Algorithm 8.
The lack of approaching a consensus model aside, we find that every Ai
produced by this algorithm often performs strongly in hinting at what data
is contained in Di. Since we know that Ai was trained exclusively on Di, we
know that if asked to classify a sample similar to the samples in Di, Ai would
classify the sample correctly with high probability. Since the public dataset, T ,
that parameter servers can use is assumed to be representative of the union of
all data contained at the workers, each parameter server can pass the entire
public dataset into each Ai and can examine Ai’s accuracy conditional on the
expected model output.
In Figure 5.1 on the next page, we architect a system with three workers
and one parameter server where Worker ID-0 supplies unperturbed MNIST
gradients trained exclusively on handwritten digits of 0, 1, and 2. Similarly,
Worker ID-1 trains on 3, 4, and 5; and Worker ID-2 trains on 6, 7, 8, and 9. We
create a confusion matrix of the output of Ai when provided the test data as
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(a) Logistic regression model.
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Figure 5.1: Active corruption, S = 1, no gradient perturbation. Attack §5.1. Con-
fusion matrices from the only parameter server in a system with three
workers, holding federated MNIST data, and never perturbing any gra-
dients before upload. That is, ∀i, ∀k, Wi,k = 1 and δi,k = 0.
input.
There are two key characteristics of the confusion matrices in Figure 5.1:
1. Whenever Ai is provided a test sample that it was trained on, it correctly
classifies the sample with high accuracy, but when provided a test sample
that it had not seen before (i.e., was not trained on), its prediction is
seemingly random. This trend can be seen on the diagonal of each indi-
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(a) Logistic regression model, parameter server 1.


























































9 1 2 5
23 25 98




































39 1 2 95
9
















































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Predicted Class





2 3 3 1 76 94
3








5 1 92 88
4

















(b) Logistic regression model, parameter server 2.
Figure 5.2: Active corruption, S = 2, no gradient perturbation. Attack §5.1. Confu-
sion matrices from a system with two parameter servers and four workers,
holding federated MNIST data, training a logistic regression model, and
never perturbing any gradients before upload. That is, ∀i, ∀k, Wi,k = 1
and δi,k = 0.
vidual confusion matrix, where the predicted label of the input sample
(horizontal axis) matches the true label of the class (vertical axis).
2. Each Ai rarely classifies any of its inputs into classes it was not trained
on. This trend can be seen in the many columns of the confusion matrices
that contain only zero (or near-zero) entries and in the few columns that
contain nearly all the non-zero entries.
Since these workers are not perturbing their gradients, it should not be
surprising that each Ai is so revealing of the data held at each worker. Similarly,
adding more parameter servers but not perturbing the gradients should not
affect the revealing power of Ai as shown in Figure 5.2.
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Somewhat surprisingly, in a system with only one parameter server, even
perturbing gradients using multiplicative weights and additive noise is not
enough to hide from Ai the labels that Di contains (see Figure 5.3 on the next
page). This is likely because after a period of ∆ iterations, parameter server j
has received gradients exactly so that the multiplicative weights applied to
each parameter sum to 1 and the additive noises sum to 0. In a case where
worker i sends gradients to at least two parameter servers, some of those weights
and noises would be “lost” to other parameter servers, and the weights and
noises received individually by each parameter server would not sum to 1 and 0,
respectively, every ∆ steps.
We see from Figure 5.4 that this prediction is correct. Adding another
parameter server and using sufficiently obfuscatory perturbation schemes makes
it difficult for a parameter server to infer the data labels held at a particular
worker. Particularly, in Figures 5.4b to 5.4c on page 61, both parameter servers
are able to deduce which images are at each worker, but once the multiplicative
weights increase to be as large as 30 (Figure 5.4a), only then do parameter
servers fail to deduce all the labels held at one worker. That is, the parameter
servers’ false positive rates (i.e., deducing a worker possesses a label that in
actuality it does not) is low, but their false negative rates are high. Notice,
however, that despite the perturbations hiding some of the labels contained at
the worker, using large weights does not obscure the information so badly that
the parameter servers can deduce nothing. For example, even though the first
parameter server in Figure 5.4a believes Worker ID-3 to possess label 6 and the
second parameter server believes Worker ID-0 to have label 2, none of those
beliefs are incorrect. All that is hidden are any additional labels that workers 0
and 2 may possess, if any.
We conclude that a parameter server that has been actively compromised
and follows Algorithm 8 instead of Algorithm 3 will be successful in deducing at
least a subset of the labels contained at each worker, even when facing gradient
perturbations from workers. This attack works best when workers have strongly
federated data, but the success of this attack when workers have small traces of
58
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(a) (Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−20, 20) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 2
2)
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(b) (Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−10, 10) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1
2)
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(c) Wi,k = 1 and δi,k = 0
Figure 5.3: Active corruption, S = 1, varying perturbations. Attack §5.1. Confusion
matrices from the only parameter server in a system with three workers,
holding federated MNIST data, using different perturbation schemes,
training a DNN model. ∆ = 5.
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(a) Logistic regression model. (Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−30, 30) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1
2).
Figure 5.4: Active corruption, S = 2, varying perturbation. Attack §5.1. Confusion
matrices from a system with two parameter servers and four workers,
holding federated MNIST data, training a logistic regression model, and
using different perturbation schemes. ∆ = 5.
other labels—potentially traces of every other label—was not investigated.
5.2 Passive Corruption
If passively corrupting a parameter server, an adversary partially hijacks a
parameter server and is able to learn all the details of the corrupted server
but is unable to alter its behavior. The adversary can read (but not tamper
with) all internal state information about a parameter server and can eavesdrop
on (but not tamper with) all inbound and outbound communication. Thus,
a passively corrupted parameter server must necessarily follow Algorithm 3
on page 23 but is able to store records of any information it wishes. It is not
unreasonable to use this type of corruption of a parameter server as a model for
an otherwise trustworthy server administrator that is simply curious to learn
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(b) Logistic regression model. (Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−10, 10) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1
2).
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(c) Logistic regression model. Wi,k = 1 and δi,k = 0.
Figure 5.4: (continued)
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whatever information she can about her workers.
In all schemes introduced here, the parameter servers exactly follows Algo-
rithm 3 except that immediately after downloading gradients from each worker i
(Line 6), they will persist gi,j,k to disk, and just before performing the multiple
gradient descent step (Line 8), they will save the current model, θkj , to disk,
as well. Note that these additional two steps affect neither the correctness
nor intermediate state of the algorithm, but may increase the overall time to
consensus from I/O overhead. After the system has reached consensus, the
parameter server will have saved multiple “chunks” of data to disk, where the
k-th chunk contains the parameter vector at step k and all the gradients received
from each of the server’s workers at step k. The parameter server is then free
to perform any of the following techniques offline in order to determine any
information it can from the gradients it received while the system was online.
5.2.1 Dissimilarity Between Ranked Gradient and Ranked
Test Gradients (Dissimilarity Attack)
Let parameter server j be interested in uncovering the data held at worker i.
Our first technique revolves around making comparisons at each k between gi,j,k
and vγj,k = ∇fTγ (θkj ), where Tγ is the portion of the public dataset, T , with
label γ ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,Γ}, where Γ+1 is the number of possible label classifications.
Note that the parameter server is equipped with all the information it needs to
compute ∇fTγ (θkj ) by itself. It possesses the intermediate state of the model at
each step k, θkj , because it was saved to disk, and it possesses the public dataset
T and can thus produce Tγ , ∀γ, without any problems.
For example, in the MNIST dataset (where Γ + 1 = 10), at each step k, the
parameter server possesses gi,j,k, the gradient received from worker i at step k,
and it possesses, ∀k,
v0j,k = ∇fT0(θkj )︸ ︷︷ ︸
gradient over label 0
, v1j,k = ∇fT1(θkj )︸ ︷︷ ︸
gradient over label 1
, . . . , v9j,k = ∇fT9(θkj )︸ ︷︷ ︸
gradient over label 9
(5.1)
62
Then, at each k, server j will compute, ∀γ,
∥∥∥arg rank (gi,j,k)− arg rank(vγj,k)∥∥∥2 (5.2)
where ‖·‖2 denotes the vector 2-norm and arg rank : RP → ZP+ outputs a vector
whose p-th element is the index of where the p-th element of the input vector
would fall if each element of the input vector were sorted by magnitude, where
highest rank signifies being the largest element in magnitude in the vector and
the smallest rank signifies the element closest to zero.
Our investigation showed that
∥∥∥gi,j,k − vγj,k∥∥∥2 did not provide a strong
enough metric for the attack to contain any useful information, and initial results
suggested the same for
∥∥∥arg rank (gi,j,k)− arg rank(vγj,k)∥∥∥1 and ∥∥∥gi,j,k − vγj,k∥∥∥1.
The intuition behind the metric posed in Equation 5.2 is that vectors




will be element-wise similar if gi,j,k was





was computed over. That is, a low score means similar gradient
vectors, which implies that the dataset Td is a good match for Di, the dataset
that worker i used to compute its gradient vector.
We can see that this approach works very well in a situation where each
worker’s dataset is very homogeneous (i.e., only contains samples of one label)
and workers do not perturb their gradients before sending them to a central
parameter server. Figures 5.5a and 5.6a show that when each worker has only
one label, parameter servers can easily distinguish which workers have which
label, but as workers build up more and more labels in their private dataset (see
Figures 5.5b to 5.5c on page 65), parameter servers have difficulties separating
the information.
Particularly interesting is that even in experiments with multiple labels per
worker (Figures 5.5b, 5.5c, 5.6b, and 5.6c) parameter servers are susceptible to
false positive errors; that is, where a parameter server wrongly concludes that a
worker possess samples of a certain label when the worker in reality does not. This
evident in Worker ID-0 of Figure 5.5c and in Worker ID-2 of Figure 5.6b, where all
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labels possessed by the workers correspond to the trendlines exhibiting the lowest
dissimiarities, but not all the trendlines exhibiting the lowest dissimilarities
correspond to labels possessed by the workers.
This attack falters, however, once workers incorporate perturbations into
their transmitted gradients if there is only one parameter server in the system
(see Figures 5.7 and 5.8). These results are unlike the results of an active
corruption attack (see Figure 5.3 on page 59), which would continue to be
successful under these conditions.
Once another parameter server is introduced into the system, though, the
attack starts showing more promise for reasons unexplained. Figure 5.9a shows
strong success in a logistic regression model, and though Figures 5.9b to 5.9c
on page 70 do not show all the labels contained at the worker, each individual
worker’s plot shows at least one of the labels contained in the worker’s dataset,
which shows this attack’s partial success in a two-server system. This is the
same relationship between false positives and false negatives we observed in
§5.1. On the other hand, using a DNN model to train on MNIST shows that an
attack even on a system with three and five workers (see Figures 5.10b to 5.10c
on page 72, respectively) is successful, though there is very little margin for
differentiation.
The metric proposed in this attack is impervious to gradient perturbation
methods that select one weight for the entire gradient vector—instead of selecting
a unique weight per element in the vector (see §4.5.3)—and use additive noises
of zero. This is because scaling the gradient vector by a constant will not affect
the ranks of any elements contained within the gradient vector. Attacks against
this weaker perturbation scheme would be exactly as successful as attacks shown
in Figures 5.5 to 5.6 on pages 65–66. This is further evidence that sending
differently scaled gradient vectors to each parameter server is not enough to
achieve privacy. The successfulness of the attack introduced here is summarized







































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.








































































































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker. αk = 0.1(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.5: Dissimilarity, S = 1, no perturbation, logistic model. Attack §5.2.1.
Multiple systems with varying number of workers, all with one parameter
server. System trains on MNIST data using a logistic regression model
and workers send unperturbed gradients to servers. That is, Wi,k = 1



































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker.


























































(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker.













































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker.
Figure 5.6: Dissimilarity, S = 1, no perturbation, DNN model. Attack §5.2.1. Mul-
tiple systems with varying number of workers, all with one parameter
server. System trains on MNIST data using a DNN model and workers




































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker.



























































(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker.











































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker.
Figure 5.7: Dissimilarity, S = 1, with perturbation, logistic model. Attack §5.2.1.
Multiple systems with varying number of workers, all with one parameter
server. System trains on MNIST data using a logistic regression model
and workers send perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼
U(−5, 5) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1









































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = (5× 10−4)(0.98)bk/400c.




























































(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.001(0.98)bk/400c.










































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker.
αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.8: Dissimilarity, S = 1, with perturbation, DNN model. Attack §5.2.1.
Multiple systems with varying number of workers, all with one parameter
server. System trains on MNIST data using a DNN model and workers
send perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−5, 5) and
(δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1













































































































































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.001(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.9: Dissimilarity, S = 2, logistic model. Attack §5.2.1. Multiple systems with
varying number of workers, where all workers are connected to both
parameter servers that perform DGD consensus with each other after re-
ceiving 40 gradient updates from each of their respective workers. System
trains on MNIST data using a logistic regression model and workers
send perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−5, 5) and
(δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1
2). ∆ = 5.
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(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.001(0.98)bk/400c.























































































































































































































































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = (1× 10−4)(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.10: Dissimilarity, S = 2, DNN model. Attack §5.2.1. Multiple systems with
varying number of workers, where all workers are connected to both
parameter servers that perform DGD consensus with each other after
receiving 40 gradient updates from each of their respective workers.
System trains on MNIST data using a DNN model and workers send
perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−5, 5) and
(δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1
2). ∆ = 5.
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(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.001(0.98)bk/400c.





















































































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker. αk = 0.001(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.10: (continued)
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5.2.2 Regress Gradient Against Test Label Gradients
((1,m)-NNLS Attack)
In this strategy, the passively compromised parameter server j re-computes the
vectors vγj,k, ∀γ, ∀k, as defined in Equation 5.7 and tries to find best non-negative
linear combination of vγj,k to produce gi,j,k. That is, the adversary is attempting
to find the best λγj,k ≥ 0 coefficients to the system


















where Vj,k is of size P ×(Γ+1) and λj,k is of size (Γ+1)×1. When P ≥ (Γ+1),
as is usually the case, this system is overdetermined, which enables us to use
non-negative least squares (NNLS) to find
arg min
λj,k
‖Vj,kλj,k − gi,j,k‖2 subject to λj,k ≥ 0 (5.4)
where λj,k ≥ 0 denotes that each element of the λj,k vector is a nonnegative real
number. That is, ∀γ, ∀k, λγj,k ≥ 0. We use the notation (1,m)-NNLS because it
is a special case of the attack introduced in §5.2.3. Details of the notation are
defined there.
The intuition here is that the adversary is trying to decompose the target
gradient vector gi,j,k into its individual label-wise components that could help
uncover which labels the gradient was computed over. We know that each gi,j,k
will be computed over a batch of training samples, but if batches are homogeneous
(i.e., only contain as few as one distinct label) then this attack would rightly
locate the vγj,k vector(s) (by finding the largest λ
γ
j,k coefficient(s)) that form
the most indicative components of gi,j,k. If batches’ samples contain multiple
labels, however, decomposing gi,j,k into component vγj,k vectors becomes harder.
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This suggests that the best way to fight against a parameter server leveraging
this attack is to use the largest batch size possible—that is, to skip stochastic
gradient descent altogether and exclusively use gradient descent, where the
entire private dataset Di is used as one “batch.” This would force the batch
to include as many labels as possible amongst its constituent samples. This
suggests that using larger batch sizes better protects the identity of the entire
dataset, Di.
We restrict all coefficients to be positive because allowing a particular
coefficient λγj,k to be negative would imply that the gradient vector gi,j,k is in
the “opposite” direction of the gradient produced over test label γ, which does
not hold much value in the context of this regression. NNLS is naturally resistant
to overfitting [39], making it a strong choice even in high-dimensional models.
Informally, forcing the coefficients to be nonnegative means that incorporating
the effect of another label’s gradient is only allowable if it brings us closer to
the target gradient and in the same direction as the target gradient, too—never
in the opposite direction. This is a useful property in this context because it
would be unintuitive to be able to “overshoot” the target gradient but then reel
the cumulative sum back towards the target by introducing the gradient of an
irrelevant test label with a negative regression coefficient.
This seems paradoxical, however, as one would intuitively think that batching
would help hide information about the private dataset. Batching is equivalent
to bounding the amount of information a gradient can encode; each outgoing
gradient can encapsulate information only about the samples within the batch
and never about samples outside the batch. This suggests that using smaller
batch sizes better protects the identity of the entire dataset, Di.
The results in Figures 5.11 to 5.12 on pages 75–76 confirm that the attack
presented here is at least successful on a standard system with S = 1 parameter
servers and C ∈ {3, 5, 10} workers that do not perturb their gradients before
sending them to the central parameter server. We find that using the magnitude
of NNLS coefficients to uncover which labels the gradients were computed

































































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.































































(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.1(0.98)bk/400c.



















































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker. αk = 0.1(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.11: (1,m)-NNLS, S = 1, no perturbation, logistic model. Attack §5.2.2.
Multiple systems with varying number of workers, all with one parameter
server. System trains on MNIST data using a logistic regression model
and workers send unperturbed gradients to servers. That is, Wi,k = 1





































































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.









































































(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.



















































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker.
αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.12: (1,m)-NNLS, S = 1, no perturbation, DNN model. Attack §5.2.2.
Multiple systems with varying number of workers, all with one parameter
server. System trains on MNIST data using a DNN model and workers
send unperturbed gradients to servers. That is, Wi,k = 1 and δi,k = 0.
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heterogeneous private dataset.
Not only does the attack presented here perform much more strongly on
unperturbed logistic regression model gradient uploads than does the attack
outlined in §5.2.1, but it also performs significantly better upon receiving
perturbed gradients, as well (see Figures 5.13 to 5.14 on pages 78–79).
The results of Figures 5.13 to 5.14 on pages 78–79 are particularly surprising
because even though each individual parameter is being independently scaled
by a factor of as large as ±5 and then independently translated by an amount
generated randomly from a Gaussian distribution, NNLS is still successful in
finding coefficients that correctly indicate to the parameter server which labels
the workers hold. This is remarkable and warrants further investigation.
Interestingly, despite how well this attack works in most cases, it performs
remarkably poorly in a system with more than one parameter server where
workers, training on MNIST data using a DNN model, submit perturbed gra-
dients (see Figure 5.16). This is the opposite of what we see in Table 5.1b,
which shows that attack §5.2.1 works poorly on a DNN model system with
one parameter server but performs excellently on a DNN model system with
two parameter servers. One noteworthy observation remains in Figure 5.16a,
however: occasionally, when one parameter cannot correctly deduce which labels
one of its workers has, the other parameter server is able to without difficulty.
Consider the “top” parameter server’s Worker ID-5 plot, which does not suggest
that Worker ID-5 possesses label 5, but the corresponding plot belonging to
the “bottom” parameter server does. The same is true for Worker ID-9, which
possesses label 9. The successfulness of the attack introduced here is summarized
in Table 5.2 on page 104.
5.2.3 Median Regression Coefficient using Subsampled
Testing Data ((Ψ,m)-NNLS Attack)
Our last strategy is similar to §5.2.2 except that instead of creating one gradient


























































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.



























































(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.















































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker.
αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.13: (1,m)-NNLS, S = 1, with perturbation, logistic model. Attack §5.2.2.
Multiple systems with varying number of workers, all with one parameter
server. System trains on MNIST data using a logistic regression model
and workers send perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼
U(−5, 5) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1












































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.

































































(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.






















































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker.
αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.14: (1,m)-NNLS, S = 1, with perturbation, DNN model. Attack §5.2.2.
Multiple systems with varying number of workers, all with one parameter
server. System trains on MNIST data using a logistic regression model
and workers send perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼
U(−5, 5) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1









































































































































































































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.001(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.15: (1,m)-NNLS, S = 2, logistic model. Attack §5.2.2. Multiple systems
with varying number of workers, where all workers are connected to
both parameter servers that perform DGD consensus with each other
after receiving 40 gradient updates from each of their respective workers.
System trains on MNIST data using a logistic regression model and
workers send perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼
U(−5, 5) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1
2). ∆ = 5.
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(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.001(0.98)bk/400c.














































































































































































































































































































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.16: (1,m)-NNLS, S = 2, DNN model. Attack §5.2.2. Multiple systems with
varying number of workers, where all workers are connected to both
parameter servers that perform DGD consensus with each other after
receiving 40 gradient updates from each of their respective workers.
System trains on MNIST data using a DNN model and workers send
perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−5, 5) and
(δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1
2). ∆ = 5.
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(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.






































































































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.16: (continued)
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groups, produce a gradient vector over each group of each label. Note that the
attack presented in §5.2.2 is a special case of the attack introduced here where
Ψγ = 1, ∀γ. We define (Tγ)ψγ as the ψγ-th split (1 ≤ ψγ ≤ Ψγ) of the portion
of the public dataset, T , whose labels are γ ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,Γ}. Then we define
vγ,ψj,k = ∇f(Tγ)ψγ (θ) (5.5)
So each passively compromised parameter server j produces at each iteration k
v0,0j,k ,v
0,1
j,k , . . . ,v
0,Ψ0
j,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
gradients over label 0
,v1,0j,k ,v
1,1
j,k , . . . ,v
1,Ψ1
j,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
gradients over label 1
, . . . ,vΓ,0j,k ,v
Γ,1
j,k , . . . ,v
Γ,ΨΓ
j,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
gradients over label Γ
(5.6)
For simplicity’s sake, we use the same number of splits per label and denote it
as Ψ. That is, Ψ = Ψ0 = Ψ1 = · · · = ΨΓ, implying the system instead computes
v0,0j,k ,v
0,1
j,k , . . . ,v
0,Ψ
j,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
gradients over label 0
,v1,0j,k ,v
1,1
j,k , . . . ,v
1,Ψ
j,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
gradients over label 1
, . . . ,vΓ,0j,k ,v
Γ,1
j,k , . . . ,v
Γ,Ψ
j,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
gradients over label Γ
(5.7)
The parameter server uses the vectors listed in Equation 5.7 to find the best
λγ,ψj,k ≥ 0 coefficients to the overdetermined system

















where Vj,k is of size P × ((Γ + 1) Ψ) and λj,k is of size ((Γ + 1) Ψ)× 1. When
P ≥ (Γ + 1) Ψ, this system is also overdetermined, we again use Equation 5.4
to find the best λγ,ψj,k ≥ 0 regression coefficients.
The intuition behind this attack is very much the same as §5.2.2, but the
difference here is that we take more strenuous advantage of the assumption that
the public dataset T contains samples that are representative of the union of
all the samples held at the workers. By splitting each label into multiple groups
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(perhaps not necessarily the same number of groups per label if, for example,
the parameter server has reason to suspect the existence of some labels over
others in the workers’ individual datasets), the attacker is better equipped to
find a more fine-grained set of test samples whose gradient suitably produces
the same gradient as (or close to) gi,j,k.
Unfortunately, unlike the attack presented in §5.2.2 which produces only
Γ + 1 coefficients, the attack presented here produces Ψ coefficients per label
in the dataset. Even a small value like Ψ = 3 for example can produce 30
coefficients for a dataset like MNIST per iteration k. To compensate, when
Ψ ≥ 2, instead of presenting the λj,k vector as we do in §5.2.2, we present each
of label γ’s Ψ coefficients’ aggregated ranks as they appear in the arg rank (λj,k)
vector, the vector containing the rank of each individual coefficient, where
higher ranks imply larger coefficients, which implies that the respective vγ,ψj,k
test gradient explains a larger component of gi,j,k. Fixing Ψ = 1, however, is
exactly equivalent to presenting the ranked coefficients from §5.2.2, so we only
consider Ψ ≥ 2.
Formally, we fix an upper threshold K and construct the sequences, Rγj ,
such that ∀γ ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,Γ}, Rγj contains all the ranks of any λ
γ,ψ
j,k coefficient
(1 ≤ ψ ≤ Ψ) in its respective k-th iteration’s λj,k coefficient array over the first






∣∣∣ψ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Ψ}〉 (5.9)
where 〈·〉 denotes a sequence, and
n⊕
i=1
si = s1 ⊕ s2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sn (5.10)
denotes the end-to-end concatenation of sequences s1, s2, . . . , sn.
















the i-th element of Rγj . The median a strong candidate for a measure of central
tendency when using ordinal data. We parameterize the attack technique using
this value of Ψ and the choice of mγj of the distribution summarization technique
and thus name this attack (Ψ,m)-NNLS.
Not surprisingly, Figure 5.22a shows the same unique pattern as Figure 5.16a
in that when one parameter cannot correctly deduce which labels one of its
workers has, the other parameter server is often able to. The successfulness of
the attack introduced here is summarized in Table 5.3 on page 104.
5.2.4 Distribution of Regression Coefficients using
Subsambpled Testing Data ((Ψ,Φ)-NNLS Attack)
We realized the median, alone, did not provide enough information from the
(Ψ,m)-NNLS attack for a meaningful attack, so we propose a fourth attack
strategy: (Ψ,Φ)-NNLS. Here, we opt to visualize the entire probability mass
function of the elements in Rγj instead of considering only the median value.
We define Φγj (r) : {1, 2, . . . , P} → [0, 1],









where r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , P} is a rank that a coefficient can possess, and Φγj (r) is the
probability—conditional over γ—that r will be the same as an element chosen
randomly from Rγj .
The results of this attack are presented in Figures 5.23 to 5.28 on pages 95–
101. The attack surprisingly performs more poorly than the (Ψ,m)-NNLS attack
(§5.2.3) but performs well in the cases of having either 10 workers, each with
a single label, or in the case when the gradients that are being uploaded are
unperturbed. The successfulness of the attack introduced here is summarized






































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.





























































(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.1(0.98)bk/400c.
















































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker. αk = 0.1(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.17: (25,m)-NNLS, S = 1, no perturbation, logistic model. Attack §5.2.3.
Varying C. System trains on MNIST data using a logistic regression
model and workers send unperturbed gradients to servers. That is,






















































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.



































































(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.

















































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker.
αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.18: (25,m)-NNLS, S = 1, no perturbation, DNN model. Attack §5.2.3.
Varying C. System trains on MNIST data using a DNN model and


















































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.





























































(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.










































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker. αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.19: (25,m)-NNLS, S = 1, with perturbation, logistic model. Attack §5.2.3.
Varying C. System trains on MNIST data using a logistic regres-
sion model and workers send perturbed gradients to servers. That is,
(Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−5, 5) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1

























































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.

































































(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.













































(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker.
αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.20: (25,m)-NNLS, S = 1, with perturbation, DNN model. Attack §5.2.3.
Varying C. System trains on MNIST data using a DNN model and
workers send perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼
U(−5, 5) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1



















































































































































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.001(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.21: (25,m)-NNLS, S = 2, logistic model. Attack §5.2.3. Varying C in QC
topology. Servers perform DGD consensus with each other after receiving
40 gradient updates from each of their respective workers. System
trains on MNIST data using a logistic regression model and workers
send perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−5, 5) and
(δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1
2). ∆ = 5.
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(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.001(0.98)bk/400c.































































































































































































































































































































(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.22: (25,m)-NNLS, S = 2, DNN model. Attack §5.2.3. Multiple systems
with varying number of workers, where all workers are connected to
both parameter servers that perform DGD consensus with each other
after receiving 40 gradient updates from each of their respective workers.
System trains on MNIST data using a DNN model and workers send
perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−5, 5) and
(δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1
2). ∆ = 5.
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(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
















































































































Worker ID-0 Worker ID-1 Worker ID-2 Worker ID-3 Worker ID-4















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-9
(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-4
(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.1(0.98)bk/400c.















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-2
(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker. αk = 0.1(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.23: (25,Φ)-NNLS, S = 1, no perturbation, logistic model. Attack §5.2.4.
Varying C. System trains on MNIST data using a logistic regression
model and workers send unperturbed gradients to servers. That is,














Worker ID-0 Worker ID-1 Worker ID-2 Worker ID-3 Worker ID-4















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-9
(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-4
(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-2
(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker.
αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.24: (25,Φ)-NNLS, no perturbation, DNN model. Attack §5.2.4. Varying C.
System trains on MNIST data using a DNN model and workers send














Worker ID-0 Worker ID-1 Worker ID-2 Worker ID-3 Worker ID-4















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-9
(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-4
(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-2
(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker. αk = 0.01(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.25: (25,Φ)-NNLS, S = 1, with perturbation, logistic model. Attack §5.2.4.
Varying C. System trains on MNIST data using a logistic regres-
sion model and workers send perturbed gradients to servers. That is,
(Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−5, 5) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1














Worker ID-0 Worker ID-1 Worker ID-2 Worker ID-3 Worker ID-4















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-9
(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-4
(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-2
(c) 3 workers, either three or four labels per worker.
αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.26: (25,Φ)-NNLS, S = 1, with perturbation, DNN model. Attack §5.2.4.
Varying C. System trains on MNIST data using a DNN model and
workers send perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼
U(−5, 5) and (δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1














Worker ID-0 Worker ID-1 Worker ID-2 Worker ID-3 Worker ID-4















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-8















Worker ID-0 Worker ID-1 Worker ID-2 Worker ID-3 Worker ID-4















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-9
(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.001(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.27: (25,Φ)-NNLS, S = 2, logistic model. Attack §5.2.4. Varying C in QC
topology. Servers perform DGD consensus with each other after receiving
40 gradient updates from each of their respective workers. System
trains on MNIST data using a logistic regression model and workers
send perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−5, 5) and
(δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1
2). ∆ = 5.
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Label (γ)
Worker ID-1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-4















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-4
(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.001(0.98)bk/400c.
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Label (γ)
Worker ID-1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-2















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-2















Worker ID-0 Worker ID-1 Worker ID-2 Worker ID-3 Worker ID-4















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-8















Worker ID-0 Worker ID-1 Worker ID-2 Worker ID-3 Worker ID-4















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Label (γ)
Worker ID-9
(a) 10 workers, one label per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
Figure 5.28: (25,Φ)-NNLS, S = 2, DNN model. Attack §5.2.4. Varying C in QC
topology. Both servers perform DGD consensus with each other after
receiving 40 gradient updates from each of their respective workers.
System trains on MNIST data using a DNN model and workers send
perturbed gradients to servers. That is, (Wi,k)p,j ∼ U(−5, 5) and
(δi,k)p,j ∼ N (0, 1
2). ∆ = 5.
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Label (γ)
Worker ID-4
(b) 5 workers, two labels per worker. αk = 0.005(0.98)bk/400c.
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Label (γ)
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The summaries of all passive attacks are presented in Tables 5.1 to 5.4 on the
following page. We select the best attack(s) from each situation and list them in
Table 5.5 on page 105. From examining these tables jointly, two very noticeable
trends emerge:
1. The first noticeable trend is that uploading perturbed gradients absolutely
helps mitigate the successfulness of any one attack in particular. We see
evidence of this trend in all tables where the attack is very successful
in attacking a system where workers upload ∇f but is unsuccessful in




+ δ>j instead (see
Tables 5.1b, 5.3a, and 5.4a).
2. The second trend is that as the number of distinct labels held at any one
worker increases, the probability of any attack succeeding decreases. This
is an intuitive result. It states that as workers possess data that is more
and more representative of other workers’ datasets and is less and less
uniquely and individually identifiable, there is a greater likelihood that no
parameter server will be able to deduce the data owned by a worker. This
is a direct consequence of the phenomenon that in the attacks presented
here, there is no way for an adversarial parameter server to distinguish
between (1) having little confident in any of the attacks’ results and (2)
being highly confident that a worker has a rich, heterogeneous dataset (i.e.,
a dataset that contains all possible labels) since each attack is self-relative.
5.3 Attack Computational Complexity
After the worker-server system has terminated , any parameter server making
the decision of whether to leverage any of the attacks described here will be
making a cost-benefit analysis of the usefulness of making such an attack. In this
section, we present the computational cost of leveraging the attacks introduced
in this work.
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10 ♣ Fig. 5.5a — Fig. 5.7a ♣ Fig. 5.9a
5 — Fig. 5.5b — Fig. 5.7b ♥ Fig. 5.9b
3 — Fig. 5.5c — Fig. 5.7c ♥ Fig. 5.9c
(a) Logistic regression model.









10 ♣ Fig. 5.6a — Fig. 5.8a ♣ Fig. 5.10a
5 ♣ Fig. 5.6b — Fig. 5.8b ♣ Fig. 5.10b
3 ♥ Fig. 5.6c — Fig. 5.8c ♥ Fig. 5.10c
(b) DNN model.
Table 5.1: Dissimilarity attack successfulness. A successful attack denoted by a ♣,
a partially successful attack denoted by a ♥, and an unsuccessful attack
denoted by a dash.









10 ♣ Fig. 5.11a ♣ Fig. 5.13a ♣ Fig. 5.15a
5 ♣ Fig. 5.11b ♣ Fig. 5.13b ♣ Fig. 5.15b
3 ♣ Fig. 5.11c ♥ Fig. 5.13c ♣ Fig. 5.15c
(a) Logistic regression model.









10 ♣ Fig. 5.12a ♣ Fig. 5.14a ♥ Fig. 5.16a
5 ♣ Fig. 5.12b ♣ Fig. 5.14b — Fig. 5.16b
3 ♣ Fig. 5.12c — Fig. 5.14c — Fig. 5.16a
(b) DNN model.
Table 5.2: (1,m)-NNLS attack successfulness. A successful attack denoted by a ♣,
a partially successful attack denoted by a ♥, and an unsuccessful attack
denoted by a dash.









10 ♣ Fig. 5.17a — Fig. 5.19a ♥ Fig. 5.21a
5 ♣ Fig. 5.17b — Fig. 5.19b — Fig. 5.21b
3 ♣ Fig. 5.17c — Fig. 5.19c — Fig. 5.21c
(a) Logistic regression model.









10 ♣ Fig. 5.18a ♣ Fig. 5.20a ♣ Fig. 5.22a
5 ♣ Fig. 5.18b ♣ Fig. 5.20b — Fig. 5.22b
3 ♣ Fig. 5.18c — Fig. 5.20c — Fig. 5.22c
(b) DNN model.
Table 5.3: (25,m)-NNLS attack successfulness. A successful attack denoted by a ♣,
a partially successful attack denoted by a ♥, and an unsuccessful attack
denoted by a dash.









10 ♣ Fig. 5.23a — Fig. 5.25a ♥ Fig. 5.27a
5 ♣ Fig. 5.23b — Fig. 5.25b — Fig. 5.27b
3 ♣ Fig. 5.23c — Fig. 5.25c — Fig. 5.27c
(a) Logistic regression model.









10 ♣ Fig. 5.24a ♣ Fig. 5.26a ♣ Fig. 5.28a
5 ♣ Fig. 5.24b ♥ Fig. 5.26b — Fig. 5.28b
3 ♣ Fig. 5.24c — Fig. 5.26c — Fig. 5.28c
(b) DNN model.
Table 5.4: (25,Φ)-NNLS attack successfulness. A successful attack denoted by a ♣,
a partially successful attack denoted by a ♥, and an unsuccessful attack
denoted by a dash.
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10 ♣ Fig. 5.5a, 5.11a, 5.17a, 5.23a ♣ Fig. 5.13a ♣ Fig. 5.9a, 5.15a
5 ♣ Fig. 5.11b, 5.17b, 5.23b ♣ Fig. 5.13b ♣ Fig. 5.15b
3 ♣ Fig. 5.11c, 5.17c, 5.23c ♥ Fig. 5.13c ♣ Fig. 5.15c
(a) Logistic regression model.









10 ♣ Fig. 5.6a, 5.12a, 5.18a, 5.24a ♣ Fig. 5.14a, 5.20a, 5.26a ♣ Fig. 5.10a, 5.22a, 5.28a
5 ♣ Fig. 5.6b, 5.12b, 5.18b, 5.24b ♣ Fig. 5.14b, 5.20b ♣ Fig. 5.10b
3 ♣ Fig. 5.12c, 5.18c, 5.24c — ♥ Fig. 5.10c
(b) DNN model.
Table 5.5: Best passive corruption attack per experiment. A successful attack denoted
by a ♣, a partially successful attack denoted by a ♥, and an unsuccessful
attack denoted by a dash.
All active and passive attacks detailed in §5.1 and §5.2, respectively, first
and foremost require that parameter servers be able to compute gradients over
the public dataset, T . The time needed to compute gradients over a dataset
is highly dependent on the model used, the amount of data accessible to the
model, and potentially the underlying properties of the neural network. As such,
we remove this cost from our analysis by black-boxing the cost of computing
one set of gradients, accuracy, and/or predictions of the θ parameters over a
dataset of size d into Υθ(d).
5.3.1 Active Attack
An adversary leveraging an active attack (§5.1) only has the task of using the
final model in each Ai to compute the corresponding confusion matrix over the
entire public dataset, T . After the system has terminated, the parameter server
will have received gradients from at most
max
k
|Ck| ≤ C (5.13)
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workers. Thus, the cost of leveraging the §5.1 attack is
O (CΥθ(|T |)) (5.14)
5.3.2 Dissimilarity Attack
An adversary leveraging a dissimilarity attack (§5.2.1) will first need to select
an upper limit K, the number of iterations’ worth of cached data the attack
will be carried out on. At each iteration, the adversary must compute Γ + 1





We first measure the time taken to compute gradients over the test dataset.
For simplicity’s sake, we define
Υ = max
γ
(Υθ (|Tγ |)) (5.15)
as the most time any one label’s gradients could take to compute. This simplifi-












Υ ∈ O (ΓΥ) (5.17)
Following that, each computation of Equation 5.2 takes O(P logP ) time to
create followed by an additional O(Γ log Γ) time to sort the individual outputs
of Equation 5.2. This must be performed for each of the C workers.
Thus, the overall runtime of §5.2.1 can be written
O (K (ΓΥ + C (Γ log Γ + P logP ))) (5.18)
5.3.3 (1,m)-NNLS Attack
An adversary leveraging the attack in §5.2.2 needs to compute Γ + 1 test gradient
labels at each iteration, which takes a total time of O (ΓΥ) (Equation 5.17).
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Then for each worker in Ck, must perform a NNLS regression where V is of
size P × (Γ + 1). Each NNLS regression takes O
(
P 2 + Γ2
)
time [30]. Then the
adversary must sort the coefficients of the regression by magnitude in O (Γ log Γ)











Now that the attack splits the test data’s individual labels into Ψ groups, we










applicable only to Equation 5.21.
An adversary leveraging the attack in §5.2.3 will largely be leveraging the
same attack as the one outlined in §5.2.2 except that the observation matrix V
is now of size P × ((Γ + 1)Ψ), and there is an additional linear-time cost to find
mγj . Finding the median dominated by the cost of the regression, O(P 2 + Γ2Ψ2),











The attack presented in §5.2.4 is very similar to that of §5.2.3 other than that
after the O(P 2 + Γ2Ψ2) regression, there is a sorting-time cost to compute the
distribution. This does not, however, change the asymptotic behavior and the
runtime is still the same as Equation 5.21.
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5.4 Defense
All the attacks conducted by a parameter server presented here require that
the parameter server be capable of accurately tracking a worker throughout
the lifetime of the system. In the active corruption attack discussed in §5.1,
that meant that the parameter server had to be able to identify a worker at
both stages: when the worker requested parameters to download and when the
worker pushed gradients for upload. Then the parameter server could pair those
two together and discriminately serve each worker its own model. In the passive
corruption attacks discussed in §5.2, compromised parameter servers need not
know which worker is making a parameter download—since in each iteration all
workers must download the same parameter vector anyway—but must be keenly
aware of which worker sent which gradients during the runtime of the system.
This way, the received gradients can be analyzed at the parameter server and
the analysis results can be paired with the correct worker.
Thus, in a real system, aside from techniques like “polluting” one’s dataset
other samples or using larger weights and/or noises, the best defense—at least
against the attacks presented here—is to use an anonymity protocol to upload
gradients to the parameter server. IP address-hiding schemes like utilizing a
VPN or making connections through the Tor anonymity network would be quite
effective in combating the attack strategies discussed here but of course come
with their own set of vulnerabilities that users must be mindful of.
It is also possible that one major contributor to the success of the passive
corruption attacks presented here is the nature of the perturbative weights used
throughout all experiments. Workers, of course, must generate their multiplica-
tive weights such that they follow Equation 4.3 on page 21, but can elect to
send more biased weights on a per-server basis.
In the experiments conducted here, the weight matrices’ entries used are





1S×1 = M 1P×1 (4.3 revisited)
but by using the same distribution to generate the random weight matrix entries,





























denotes the j-th column of the
matrix A. Note that the veracity Equation 5.22 is a byproduct of implementation
choices and is not a requirement of the original algorithm in [14].
This means that over ∆ consecutive steps, every weight applied to the each
of the P parameter’s gradients from worker i to parameter server j sums in
expectation to a constant—the same constant. This could be the reason behind





δ>j were successful at all. We recommend closer investigation into uncovering
the reasons behind the failure of this attack.
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6 Conclusion
In this work, we build a Python framework for a specific set of distributed
gradient descent algorithms that consist of two primary components, parameter
servers and workers, that cooperate to jointly find the minimum of a shared cost
function. Parameter servers, data-less entities responsible for making available
their individual and up-to-date estimates of the optimum, stay in step with each
other and enable inbound requests so workers, data-rich entities responsible for
providing computation power independently of any other worker, can request
their current parameter estimates and can send back to the parameter servers
gradients of the shared cost function computed over the worker’s own private
dataset. In this way, multiple workers can work side-by-side to minimize a cost
function over the union of their own private datasets by means of sharing mutual
parameter server(s) without ever communicating directly with any other worker,
without needing to know of any other worker’s existence, and most importantly
without ever needing to share their private datasets with any other entity in
the system, parameter servers and workers, alike.
We analyze various system parameterizations and find that systems with
more workers and more worker-server connections converge faster to the optimum
when data is distributed uniformly between workers and when comparing number
of samples seen at each worker. We also learn that systems in which parameter
servers and workers exchange only a fraction of their data (i.e., a fraction of
their parameter vector and a fraction of their gradient vector, respectively) leads
not only to a slower convergence rate but also a lower final accuracy, which may
or may not be reversible by increasing the initial learning rate.
We additionally implement a set of consensus strategies used to ensure the
parameter servers’ parameters stay reasonably aligned. We evaluate the perfor-
mance of these strategies to confirm our intuition that while these strategies to
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converge to the optimum if properly tuned, they increase time to convergence by
introducing—more than anything—another degree of freedom into the system
that needs to be compensated.
We lastly implement a set of attack strategies designed to break roughly the
privacy guarantees provided by the system. While the system guarantees that
the individual worker’s loss functions will remain private, our attacks target
uncovering information about the underlying dataset over which those loss
function are defined. We find that our attacks are largely successful and note
that the most effective way to thwart these attacks is to develop a layer of
anonymity between the parameter servers and the workers. For a solution that
does not breach the system design specifications, we recommend using stronger
perturbations and using less homogeneous batches in order to leak less sensitive
information through gradient uploads.
6.1 Difficulties Faced
One persistent challenge through all the experiments conducted was deciding
on a suitable learning rate. Choosing a learning rate too large would mean the
system would easily overshoot the target minimum, and in the case of DNNs,
this would occasionally coerce one parameter to assuming the value of NaN
which would destroy the whole experiment, as neither gradients nor accuracies
could be computed thereafter. This is even more of a problem when multiple
workers are concurrently sending their gradients to a parameter server, which
is incorporating the gradients with the same learning rate across all workers.
Thus, if a system of one worker and one parameter server could converge with
αk = 10−2, once there are C > 1 workers, the learning rate effectively experiences
a C-fold increase. Choosing a learning rate that decayed too slowly would mean
the system would have a large steady state error for a long time, but choosing
a learning rate that decayed too quickly from a even very high starting point
would mean that the learning rate would soon assume a value too close to
zero for it to ever be able to make any further progress towards the function
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minimum. This made drawing conclusions particularly difficult when a system
did not converge to the same level of accuracy that other tests did. Was it
because there was a setting to blame in the experiment? Perhaps the random
weights were too high or perhaps the parameter servers were not performing
consensus often enough to see convergence? Or perhaps the learning rate was
just too small, and we are unfairly penalizing the other controlled variables of
the experiment when they were never at fault.
We attempted to mitigate the risk of this second case by introducing αmin,
as seen in Equation 4.15 on page 29. While this solution would work given
enough time to reach convergence, it creates issues (1) with scheduling other
experiments efficient and (2) with settling into a steady state with a non-zero
error. Should a worker-server system like this ever be utilized in the real world,
the maintainers of the system will need closely consider how they will be tackling
the issue of creating a feasible sequence {αk} and moreover how they will be
able to confirm the confidence in their choice.
6.2 Future Work
From a theoretical perspective, the algorithm presented here will have to be
modified to support unexpected joins and exits of parameter servers and workers
in order to match the abilities of other system’s capabilities [26].
From an analytical point of view, we did not perform a rigorous investigation
into the system’s ability to handle asynchronous gradient updates from workers,
partial gradient updates from workers, or “clipped” gradient updates from
workers (i.e., where each gradient is capped at some thresholded magnitude).
From an implementation standpoint, we did not fully implement an encrypted
parameter-gradient exchange over HTTPS, which was a critical assumption in
forming the attack strategy introduced in Chapter 5 nor did we fully investigate
all possible code acceleration strategies. Perhaps reimplementing our system in
C++ or in Cython would provide adequate speed ups to be able to run more
experiments at lower learning rates, thereby better guaranteeing convergence to
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an optimum without needing to worry about the concerns presented in §6.1.
From an adversary’s agenda, we did not look into using statistical techniques
beyond linear regression to explain/inspect gradients received from workers. It
is possible that machine learning-based techniques would be useful here. We also
did not adequately answer the concern of our choice in random distributions
highlighted using Equation 5.22 on page 109. There was also discussion of
taking a look at how well these attacks work when the data labels are not
so strictly segregated between workers. For example, instead of one worker
containing data of three labels in equal parts, consider the worker’s private
dataset consisting of 30% of one label, 30% of another label, 30% of a third label,
and 10% of hodgepodge of labels. We discussed that the more heterogeneous the
workers’ private datasets, the more they would be protected against a parameter
server’s attack, but how heterogeneous does this have to be? Lastly, we did not
investigate the applicability of our gradient-based attacks on parameter-based
attacks (e.g., if a parameter server wants to learn about another parameter
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